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ABSTRACT 
In September 1982 the Secretary of Commerce was authorized (by Title ([ of 
H.R. 5890 of the 97th Congress) to plan and provide for the management and 
operation ot the civil iand remote sensing satellite system, to ~rovide for user fees, 
and to plan for the transfer of the ownership and operation of future civil 
operational land remote sensing satellite systems to the private sector. As part of. 
the planning for transfer, a number of approaches were to be compared incJuding 
wholly private ownership and operation of the system by an entity competitively 
selected, mixed government/private ownership and operation, and a legislatively-
chartered privately-owned corporation • 
This rep" .. t presents the results of an analysis and comparison of a limited 
number of fin1ncial and organizational approaches for either transfer of the 
ownership and operation of the civil operational land remote sensing program to 
the private sector or government retention. The following basic approaches were 
considered. 
• 
• 
Continued ownership and operation by the federal government (planned 
phase-out) 
Continued ownership and operation by the federal government (es~:lt;­
lishment of necessary budget line itl'"ms to continue prOvision of the 
da ta services) 
• Wholly private ownership and operation of an entity competitivt;:!y 
selected 
• Phased private ownership (government ownership and operation w~th 
private $ector marketing) 
• Legislatively-chartered, privately-owned corporation. 
Each of these scenarios was developed based upon the same demand forecasts and 
the same schedule of events. Government net cash flows were deVf~loped in r.t11 
cases. For the private se.:tor scenarios, financially viable business ventures WE!re 
developed based u~on achieving return on capital and other financial measure!;; 
deemed necessary to achieve financing. The required rates of return were obtained 
thrOugh the use of government subsidies. For each scenario a complete set of 
financial plans was developed. Nonfinancial issues were identified in general and 
specifically relatp.d to each scenario. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
F\)t" more than a decade, and a~ a cost estimated to be in excess 01 
$1., bUlion, the U.S. government has conducted research, development and demon-
stration of land remote sensing technology. These program~ have now progressed 
to the point where data is being obtained or. a continuous basis from a land 
observation satellite (LANDSAT D) and .nformation products are provided to and 
utiUzed by government, industry and foreign organizations. During the past few 
years attention has increasingly focused on the operational nature of the LANDSAT 
system which includes Ii space data coUection segment and a ~r~und processing and 
information disseminatioll segment. The federal government, rcal1zing the opera-
tional nature of the system designated, in November 1979 the Nationai Oceano· 
graphic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to manage the LANDSAT system, 
NOAA was ~lected as the operating agency because of its experience in manau.ng 
and opl!rating '" ~ National Environmental Sa teUite System which has irlvolvf!d 24 
en\' ironmental sateHites since 1966 [ 1 ]. 
As the land observation satellite system continued to evolve, attentlon has 
focused on the appropriate public secto. and private sector roles [2-2u]. In 
keeping with this, in September 1982 the Secretary of Cominerce was authorized to 
plan and provide for the management and operation of tne civil land remote sensing 
sateUite system, including the LANDSAT 0 and 0' satellites and .usociated ground 
system equipment transferred from [\jASA; to prov ide for user fees; and to plan for 
the transfer of the ownership and operation of future civil operational hlf~d r'!mote 
sensing satelJite systems by the private sector, when in the natiol'al interest (10 J, 
As part of this planning for the transfer of the ownership and operation ot dvl1 
operational land remote sensing satellite system~ to the private sector, the 
Secretary was requested to: 
A. 
B • 
C. 
Conduct a study to define the needs of the government {or land remote 
sensing data 
Determlne and describe the equipment, ~oft·"'··lre and data inventory 
susceptible to transfer to the private sector 
Compare various feasible financial and organizational aP:>rl'laches for 
such a transition. 
Criteria for the comparison was to include considel'aticns such as: maintenance of 
data continuity; maintenance of U.S. leadership; national security; international 
". 
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obligations; potential for market growth; cost to the governmentl independence of 
subs.: I I)r financial guarant~ from the government; potential of financial retl4r1l 
to tne governmr.!nt and price of data to users. The following approaches were to be 
compared: 1) Whot'l private ownership and oper"tion of the system by on entity 
competitively selected; 2) mixed government/private ownership and operation; .snd 
3) a ie.Ji!13tjvely-chartered, privately-owned corporation. 
In addition to the above lStudies and cornpal'lsons, the ~~<.:retar)' wall asked to 
fund at least two parallel studies outside the government 50 as to Independ"ntly 
conduct the comparisons called for above. ECON, Inr:. w"s selected e:1(I)' 1n 
Jilnuary 1983 as one of the contractors to p~rform these :itudies. The results of 
this work are reported herein. 
The specUic objective of the study was to provide an analysis and comparison 
of a limited number of financial and organizational apf)roaches for either tranlSfer 
of the ownership and operation of the ci"U operational land remote sensing 
program to the private sector or government retention. The following basic 
apprndchc!\ for commercialization or retention were co."lderedz 
• C·.lntinued ownership and operation by the federal governmr,nt (plolnned 
phase-out) 
• 
• 
Continued ownership and operation by the federal government (estdb-
lishment of necessary budget line items to continue provision of the 
data services) 
Wholly private ownership and operation of an entity competitively 
selected 
• Phased private ownership (government ownership olnd operation wi1.h 
private :sector marketing) 
• Legisladvely-chartered, privately-<>wned '.;orporatioa. 
We have taken the position that in order to eval.uate the alternatlvp.s iT is 
necl!ssnry to plan potential business ventures and evaluate their financial merit, 
the llkeHhood "f their financing and their impact on government cash flows. We 
have tr-iud to play the role of an entrepreneur, puttin~ together business plans for 
the pur Jose of obtaining financing. The business plans are based upon a perceived 
technology base and a market forecast. The market forecasts are felt to be 
reasonably conservative because of the selected role (as entrepreneur). It is 
obviolJs that many business scenarios may be d~veioped, ranging t.rom flymg an 
instrument in the Space Shuttle and selling resulting images, to the Communica-
tions Satellite Corporation's proposal to acquire and operate a COMbined land 
observation and meteorological satellite system. Due to the very fimte nature ot 
.~ ..i~~:~,lIt ~ 
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this study, a specific buslne~ system was defined (Section " and used "I the 
common basis for analyzing the various appro~ches for cornmerdaUzatlon or 
retention of the land remote sensing system. It must be empha~&zed ttia t this 
,ystem r.as not been optimized either from the poirt of view of private sector 
proUt maximization or pubUc sector benefit maximization. It appears to be a 
reasonable posslbll1ty with its main virtue being the introduction of commonality 
which fadUtates comparison between aU ot the approaches analyzed. 
It should be noted that the selected business system does not Include "vall!e 
added" functions. It was not possibLe within the scope of the current effort to 
obtain sufficient information to -tHow the planning of value ,lddea business 
ventures. 
Figure 1.1 presents an overview of the study approach. Th" Urst step was the 
development of the financial and organizational options of interest. In order to 
compare these options or scenarios, a common business sc~nario was deflned. This 
included a schedule of events, data flows and other important features. This is 
described in Section 3, The Business 5ctmarl0. Section 2 pre5eFlu, as geraeral 
background, a description of the current land obse:rvation system upon which the 
business sy!ttem buiJds. A demand forecast was made based upon a review of the 
published literature and discussions with current and potential user groups and 
competitive suppliers of information products. The demand forecasu and pro-
jected revenues are described in Section 4, The Marketplace. Thes~ forecasts and 
projections were held constant across aU scenarios. CCJst estimates were based 
upon detailed data obtained from the current operating entities and are described, 
as appropriate, in Section 6.1 through 6.4. Detailed schedules in support of the 
speciflc cost ltcm:s are presented in appendices. 
The demand forecasts and the cost estimates together with other information 
such as recoupment, leasing and subsidy pollcies and desired return on capital 
served as input to the financial analyses. The financial analyse~ developed the pro 
forma income statements, cash flow statements and balance slll~f'!'S for a ten-year 
planning period. The financial analyses were performed for each of the scenarios 
of interest. The specific scenarios are described in Secti,>n , and the financial 
analyses are described in Section 6. The financial analyses were used as input to a 
governme'nt cash flow analysis-this is also discussed in Section 6. 
The results of the financial analyses were reviewed by a group of individuai:} 
with expel'tise in the capital markets. The review established financial criteria 
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that must be met in order to have a viable busine~~ venture-i.e., attract 
investment funds from capital markets. These criteria are desc:ribed in Section 6 
as we!! as the general procedure used in the financial analyses. 
In paraUei with, and at times providing guidance to the financial analyses, an 
assessment of nonfinancial issues was performed. These inc:ludec.J political, 
institutlonal, legal/regulatory, international, national security and policy issues. 
Thes~ .v:..; discussed in Section 7 with emphasis placed on differences in the ir 
I!ffects upon the different scenarios. The objective of considering these issues was 
to establish policy, legislative and organizational requir~rnents that are deemed 
necessary for each of the scenarios to be viable. 
General and specific observations and conclusions are presented in Section 8 
and recommendations are presented in SectifJn 9. 
The data utilized in this study was obtained from the indicated referenced 
documents and from discussions with individuals in government agencies and 
commercial organizations. These included the National Oceanographic & Atmos-
pheric Administration; National Aeronautics & Space Administration; U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, both the Foreign Agriculture Service and the Statistical 
Reporting Service; the Central Intelligence Agency; the Department of Interior, 
including the Bureau of Land Management. the U.S. Geological Survey and the 
Earrh Resources Observation System Data Center; U.S. Foreign Service; Communi-
catkn!» Satellite Corp.; Spot Image; RCA; General Electric; American Science: and 
Technology Corp.; GeoSat; Metrics; Lockheed; Hughes Clnd Terra-Mar. Due to time 
constraints this data could r.ot be independently validated or estimated. The fact 
that this data is used in the study reported herein should not be interpreted to 
mean that these estimates are considered '':0 be valid. 
':i)' 
, 
t 
~I 
., 
~ . 
,,~. ;'~r~'~~T"-"~"'~' ---.-..... '1'"" "'!'I". .... , _",._"m_og"""_m{.'t1.~' 
• 
( 
f. 
6 
2. l'HE CURRENT LAND OBSERVATION SYSTEM 
Remote sensing implies the detection of the nattJre or condition of an object 
without touching it. The advent of first the photographic camera and later th~ 
airplane represented major advances in remote sensing. Space remote sensing was 
first tried experimentaJJy when cameras were used on manned orbital flights to 
take multispectral photographs of the Earth. Later, in 1973, Skylab was outfitted 
with sensors designed to the specifications of the Departments of the Interior and 
Agriculture, which used the data in programs that tested possible applications in 
planning, management and resource conservation [21]. 
The LANDSAT program began in July 1972 when the first LANDSAT sateHite 
(the Earth Resources Technology SateJJite-l) was launched by NASA. The program 
began as a research and development effort to determine the usefulness of sateJlite 
mul tispectral information, provided as synoptic views of the Earth's surface [22]. 
In the ten years that foHowed three more LANDSAT sateHites were launched so 
that a continuous flow of information about the earth's surface was transmitted 
over an extended period. of time. LANDSAT data has been used regularly in a wide 
range of applications from crop forecasting to mapping, to land use planning and 
resource management. ''i'he program has developed into a vdluable source of 
~nformation for agricultura.i and urban planning, geologic exploration, land mana~e­
ment studies, snow melt and flood runoff analysis, crop stress location and other 
tasks requiring large-scale views of the Earth's surface areas. 
LANDSA T D (LANDSAT 4) was launched July 16, 1982 into i\ polar orbit at an 
altitude of 705 kilometers. It r":lfcles the Earth every 98.9 minutes and images the 
same 185 kilometer swath of the Earth's surface every 16 days. A foHow-on 
sateUite, LANDSAT D', is available to replace or supplement LANDSAT D. 
The LANDSAT data collection system consists of the LANDSAT D sateJiite in 
orbit, the LANDSAT D' satellite currently in storage, a commOnications sateJiite 
system, ground receiving stations, a ground data processing and satellite control 
facility, and a data distributi
' 
n center. 
2.1 LANDSA T D and 0' S:: ~eUites 
LANDSAT D (and D') illustrated in Figure 2.1, consists of the Standard Multi-
Mission Modular Spacecraft and a mission unique instrument module. The space-
craft, which is compatible with Space Shuttle launch and retrieval, contains the 
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attitude control, communications, data handling and power subsystems. Included in 
the instrument module are the Multi-Spectral Scanner ('vlSS), Thematlc ~1apper 
(T~O, a wideband communications subsystem, high-gain and other antennas, and ii 
solar array that can generate two 1<i1owatts of power. The MSS is a radiometer, an 
instrument that coUects and measures energy reflecte-:i or ~rr,itted in di~.::r~t(': 
intervals of the electromagnetic spectrum. !t has four spectral bands in the visible 
and near infra!"ed portions of th~ spectrum and has an SO meter 5patlal re50l'.lti0:1. 
The TM works like the MSS bl't is a seven band multispectral, high !"e~ohl'Cbn 
scanner with 30 meter spatial resolution [20]. 
2.2 Commun)cations System 
Until the launch of NASA's Tracking Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), 
da'ta coming directly from LANDSAT D will be received by ground receiving 
stations located in the U.S. and 11 foreign countries. Coverage is limited by 
receiving station line-of-sigilt, since LANDSAT D has no on-board recording 
capability. The U.S. has arranged to receive foreign scenes by mail from these 
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stations albeit sometime's with long delays. Once TDRSS is b operation it will 
receive data from LANDSAT and transmit it to a ground receiving station at White 
Sands, New Mexico. This location was selected to minimize propagation effects on 
the TDRSS down-link. The positioning of the sateUites in the TDRS system (one at 
4l oW and one at 171 0 W longitude) will aHow for data acquisition from nearly aU of 
the earth's surface. Foreign ground stations will continue to coHect data for their 
own use directly from the satellite and can obtain other scenes from the U.S. 
facility at Sioux FaHs. 
Data received at White Sands is de modl.'.1al.ed , separated and recorded on 
separate wideband data recorders. Compacted raw data tapes are prepared and 
transmitted via a domestic ccmmunications sateHite (hereinafter referred to as 
DOMSA T) from White Sands to the processing facilities located at Goddard Space 
Fllght Center in Greenbelt, Maryland with, under normal conditions, a data delay 
of no more than eight hours from sensor observatic"Jn to availability for processing 
at GSFC. In the case of a DOMSAT failure: of gr~:1ter tllan two days, the raw data 
tapes will be mailed from White Sands to GSFC (23]. Once MSS data is processed 
at GSFC it is sent through DOMSAT to the EROS Data Center (EDe) at Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota. 
The TDRSS and DOMSAT communications satellite systems will substantially 
reduce time deic:\ys that have been encountered in shipping data from foreign 
ground stations to the U.S. and from LANDSAT ground receiving stations to 
Goddard Space Flight Center, a.nd subsequently to EDC. 
2.3 Ground Segment 
Raw data is receivd at GSFC, is stored on high density tapes (HDT R) and 
sent to the Image Generation Facility for preprocessirlg, framing, radiometric 
correction and computation of geometric correction matrices, to produc.e a high 
density archival tape (HDT A)' in the case of MSS data. TM data is processed 
further, into computer compatible tapes a. d film [24]. Separa te (computer) 
processing strings exist for MSS and TM proce&sing. 
User requests for data acquisition over specific land areas are input into the 
system through a mission management facility which senc!s such request.s to the 
Control and Simulation' Facility for spacecraft orbital operation planning and 
scheduling (24]. A basic data set is routinely acquired, but a user may make a 
request for "special acquisition data" (for which there is a fee). The mi~sion 
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management facility also provides image dat"_ production management, manage-
ment reporting, database management, control point library generrstion, inventllry 
control and ground segment management. 
Control and monitoring of the spacecraft, coordination 01 the ground 
schedules with the spacecraft, pertormance analysis and mission plan"ing are 
handled by the Control and SImulation FacUity r. 23]. 
F.valuatio'1 I)f the image data, with emphasis on assessir.g syst~rns handling 
TM oata, 1.; Cl)ndu..::ted by the LANDSAT As:;essme-nt System [23 J. Fi~ure 2.2 
illustrates the flow of information in the ~round sp.gment. 
2.4 Data Distribution Center (EOe) 
MSS data on high density archival tapes are relayed from I~S:=(: through 
DO\l\SA T ~o the EROS data Center (EDC) located in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. At 
E.De the incoming data is recorded on high density tape, which is sent through che 
EROS Digital Image Processing System to ascertain readability, correct gc"m~try 
and generate blacl< and white 241 mm latent fUm. The film is prJcessed into a film 
mastel;' and the HO rand Wm master are archived. When scenes .:lre ordered, 
digital prodl4cts will be generated from the HOT and film products from the film 
rna:;ter [25]. 
Goddard-produced TM film will be inspected for quality and cloud cover and a 
working master generated and stored in the archives. j\l\ digital data (on CCl',,) 
will be inspected for physical defects [25]. Products will be produced from th"! 
film master or CCT to fiU customer's orders. 
The Center's computer complex controls a database of over six mUHon 
images and photo~raphs of the Earth's surfa,ce features [20]. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the flow of information in the totai LA:"JOSA T system. 
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3. THE BUSINESS SCENARIO 
Underlying the analysis and comparison of the Hnar,cial and organizational 
approaches for either transfer of the ownership and operation of the civil land 
remote sensing program to the private sector or government retention is a basic 
commonality. This commonality is with respect to the level of service provided in 
the marl<etplace and hence product sales. Thus a point of departure is a set of 
products having the same attributes (including price, resolution, timeliness, etc.) 
over time for each of the scenarios. The result is a demand forecast that is 
independent of scenario, a timeHne or schedule of events that IS independent of 
scenario, and a basic business concept that is independent of scenario. With these 
factors constant from scenario to sce'1arlO, attentlOn can be focused on the 
relative attractiveness of 3cenarios, their affect on government cash flowl, the 
impact of recoupment poliCies and other factors. 
The anticipated schedule of events that is a major factor driving the costs of 
all the business scenarios is illustrated in Figure 3.1. For reasons to be discurse(~ 
subsequently, it is assumed that commercial operntion wiii commence at the star~ 
of fiscal year 198.5. If this date is delayed, continuity of service will be 
jeopardized unless !t.) federal government initiates procurement of another backup 
s,'ltellite (in addition to DI). A number of specific events and their timing (fiscal 
yead is shown. LANDSAT D was launched in FY82. It has already run into 
problems which have necessitated operations on backup subsystems. It is assumed 
that the multi-spectral scanner (MSS), having 80 meter resolution, will fail at the 
end of FY85 and the thematic mapper (T~t), having )0 meter resolution, will fail at 
the end of FY 84. It should be noted that specific failure dates have been assumed 
for events that are basically random in nature. It is assumed that the MSS is the 
primary sensor and that LANDSAT DI wiJi be launched during FYS5 in anticipation 
of an MSS failure. It is felt that this Claunch on antici.pation) is important to 
demonstrate t!-Ie intention of continuity of ~ervice to potential user:) uf the 
information products. LANDSAT DI also has an ~,tSS and a TM. It is assumed that 
this TM will fail after approximately two years of service and that the MSS is 
placed into an in-orbit spare status at about the same time. 
Immediately upon commercialization it is assumed that two LANDSAT Es 
will be procured. LANDSAT E will consist of the same "bus" llsed in LANDSAT D 
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and LANDSAT 0' (the Muhi-Miuion Spacecraft), plus a solid state version of the 
MSS-a multi-linear array heving a stereo capability. The stereo capability allows 
the observation of scenes at diH~rent angles from the nominal ground ~rack. This 
procurement must proceed with haste since in the absence of LANDSAT e. there is 
no spare for the MSS on l.ANDSAT 0' and continuiry of service is in jeopardy. 
Continuity of service is deemed extremely important since, as will be discussed, 
the large part of the demand for information products is associated with renewable 
resources which require up-to-date information. Two spacecraft are procured in 
order to have a reasonaole chance for the desjr~d continuity of service. The 80 
meter resolution MLA is indicated because time is of the essence, and the 
development of a )0 meter resolution ~LA would require an extendeo development 
schedule. It is anticipated that the two LANDSAT E spacecraft together with the 
... 
LANDSAT 0' MSS on-orblt spare will provide service through FY92. 
During FY91 LANDSAT F, having a solid state version (multi-linear array) of 
the TM with 30 meter resolution, will be launched. It Is assumed that the decision 
to develop LANDSAT F will be based upon a market analysis and that two 
spacecraft will be procured. These wH1last through the remainder ot the planning 
horizon. Since it is likely that additional spacecraft will he required in the 'atter 
part of the 19905, expendltures for their development and procuremenT 
(LANDSAT G) will be required during the pl;:snning horizon. 
As will be discussed in Sectlon 4, there is d need for t)oth 8(J meter and 30 
meter resolution information products. LANDSA T F will have a )0 meter 
resolution capability. To satisfy both the 30 and 80 meter product needs, the 30 
meter data will be degraded to produce 80 meter products as necessary. This will 
aHow attribute pricing poHcies to contInue and to prov ide the lower priced 
products required by the renewable resource commuI,ity. 
The basic concept of the land remote sensing business system is shown in 
Figure 3.2. It is assumed that the government will cor-dnue to perform R&D 
related to the development 01 sensors and associated tt!chnologies and new 
information extraction techniques. The results of this R&D wiil be aval1able to the 
land observation venture. The land observation venture will utilize the tracking 
data relay sateLlite (TDRSS) and domestic communication satellite (DOMSAT) 
* . The question of number of spacecraft to be procured is addressed in 
Appendix A dna is based upon the use of a stochastic mission and life cycle 
cost simulation model. SATIL • 
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FIGURE 3.2 BASIC CONCEPT OF LAND REMOTE SENSING BUSINESS SYSTE~1 
servlces. The venture will aLso utilize launch services provided oy either 
* government or nongovernment operations, It is assumed that initiaUy the venture 
will utilize services (archiving and sales-not marketing) provided by the EROS 
Data Center which will be reimoursed for all costs incurred. The venture will, in 
essence, take over the Goddard Space Flight Center Data Processing Facllity and 
the White Sands Ground Station. At an appropriate point in time, aU datu 
prucessing and sales facilities will be consolidated at White Sands (White Sands 
must remain since it was se!ected in order to minimize communication problems 
with the TDRSS) • 
. _--
* Launch services are a potential problem. The LANDS/\ T seri~s is desJgnF.:c1 to 
be launched on a D~!1ta vehicle. At present, N.ASA does not plan:" have 
Delta vehicles avaJable after the launch of LANDSAT D'. There are no 
definitive plans for commercialization of the Delta, ,although this is a 
possibility. In the absence of the Delta, there appear to be ether possi-
bilities-a West Coast Shuttle launch or the use of Ariane. Because 
LANDSAT series spacecraft are not optimized for Shuttle launch and the 
limited number of payloads to be launched from the West Coast, it is likely 
that the LANDSAT launch would be charged for a dedicated Shuttle flight. 
This would impose a significant penalty on the LANDSAT observuticn 
business venture. A new spacecraft could also be developed to reduce laltnch 
cost~ but development cost would be incurred. In the financial analysis 
considerations i;'l Section 6 the cost of a Delta launch ($35 million--FY83$) 
has been a.ssumed. 
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It is assumed that the foreign ground stotions will be franchised, each having 
a region within which it is the sole supplier ot informotion products. The foreign 
ground stotions Will continue to be able to obtain direct readout from the sateHites 
when they are observable. Annual fees will bt! paid for this. Scenes so obtaineo 
can be distributed within the franchise area without restrictions. The foreign 
ground station will be (esponsible for sales in its region of information products 
that cannot be obtained by direct readout. Revenue from sales so obtained will be 
spHt with a portion maintained by the ground station and the remainder paid to the 
U.S. venture which will provide the necessary information products. The gOill is to 
establish a foreign marketing organization using the existing ground stations as tht! 
starting pomt. FranchisC!s may also be t!stabHshed without having a ground station. 
Figure 3.3 il1ustra(es the staged operations of the business system and the 
flow of in10rmation. Stage I utilizes the system configuration which wiU be in 
place in FY8.5. Stage II consolidates all functions at White Sands. During Stage I 
LANDSAT observation satellite data is transmitted via TDRSS to the tracking and 
readout facility at White Sands which (;l rnmunicates this data via DOMSA T to the 
system management and processing center at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). 
Data is processed into information products at GSFC which then communictes the 
bulk of these products to EDC via DOMSAT. The foreign ground station!:; receive 
direct readout from the land observation satellite and also receive requested 
scenes from EDC. 
During the second stage the data proce~sing, archiving, sales a,,~ tracking, 
and control facilities are consolidated at Whi.te Sands. This aJlows the elimination 
of duplicatIon of facilitles and eliminates the need for DOMSAT cor,'municatlons. 
The previously defined events schedule and business concepts serve as the 
common basis for evaluating the alternative financial and organizatlonaJ scenarios. 
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4. THf. ~t\RKETPLACE 
frpducts 
LANDSA T 0 provides data from two sensors, the Mu1tl-Spectr~1 Scanner 
(MSS) und the Thematic Mapper (TM), which is processed Into photographic images 
and computer digital tapes. Each LANDSAT scene covers an area whose 
dimenslons are 18' kUometers on e~ch side. Data is provided from the ,\1SS In four 
spectral bands with a spatial resolution ot approximately 80 meters. The TM 
obtains data in seven spectral bands with a spatial resolut.ion of approximately 30 
meters. Customers for resu!tmg information products may order photographlc 
images in film and paper, po~itive and negative format, in blacl< and white and 
* color, and in sizes from 70 mm to 41.1 inches. Digital products may be ordered in 
p;v:iaUy or fuUy corrected forma ts. 
The basic collected data and resulting processed information products have 
value only to the extent that they can be interpreted and applled in decision 
making and planning. In the years since the 'vluiti-Spectral Scanner has been 
available, techniques have been 11·,weloped to utilize the information p.roducts in a 
wide range of app1&cations. Information acquirl~d through analyses of LANDSA l' 
datil has demonstrated mlue in crop assessments and yield forecasts, forest and 
range inventory and monitoring, soil analysis. sur face water delineation, land cover 
ciassil.\cations, mapping, urban planning, location of 011 and mineral resources and 
the understanding of the compos!tl!)n d the Earth's surface. 
The Foreign Agric'tural Service, for example, uses LANDSAT data In 
providing information to aid U.S. fumers and trader!; to adjust to changes in world 
demand for U.S. agricultural pn.1ducts [2 ~. Maps produced with the aid o! 
LANDSA T data are being used by the Bureau of Land ,\1anagement in their 
management 01 federal land, by the Corps of ~ngineers in conducting dam 
inspections, and by several states in urban land-use delineation and hydrologic land 
use planning [ 1 ]. \-tany oil and gas companies have developed in-house computer 
processing ca,QlbiHties for L\NDSAT data interpretation to assist in their world-
wide exploration activities. This !atter ap!Jllcation has probably been the largest 
non federal user of LANDSAT tapes and imagery products. 
* ' A distinction is made between dat;:& pr:>duct!., the raw data prior to processing 
and informatIon products, the processed data made available for s,lle in the 
forrn of imagery or d ~ita! tapes. 
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The increased resolution, new spectral bands, in addition to narrower bands 1n 
green, red and near infrared of the Thematic Mapper oHer advantages beyond 
those of th~ Multi-Spectral Scanner and, consequently, increased value in appJica-
tions. However, TM data is costlier than MSS data ($2,800 for a TM scene in tape 
tormat versus $650 for an MSS scene in tape format), and for some uses the 
ir.r.l'ea'S\~d ,=ontent af t1 T:Vi scene may not ju~tiiy the higher costs. 
New spec.:tral bands will enable differentiation among a wider va:lecy 01 
crops, vegetation, rock and soil types than was possib.1e with the MSS. Measure-
rnent ot suriace temperature will "How identitication of plant np.alth and irnpl'ove 
identification of Individual plant type, ai.d may be used in identifying and mapping 
surface composition for geoiogical studies. 
Increased spatial resolution will permit more effective use of data in land use 
mappmg and planning, storm water management and geologic mapping because 
features are more distinct in TM observations. 
4.2 Customers 
U~ers oi information prlJducts from a lan.d remote sensing system have 
olJfer'.!llt r.eed.s (based upon applications) for specific product attributes such as 
spatial resolution, number and !vt:~tion of spectral bands, frequency of observation, 
timeliness of delivery of information, and area of coverage. The users of the 
information products, depending upon applications, require information products 
that are packaged in different forms ranging from film tf) high den~ ity digital 
tapes. Some users requ:re a large number ot scenoes on a repetitive basis (the 
renewable resource applications) while others require a small number of scenes on 
a nl")nrei'eti~ive ba:;i5 (the nonrenewable resource applications). T~e former 
appHcatlons generally have relatively low · .. aIue pp.r scene whereas the latter 
,-\ppUca tions have :'e!atively high value per sc.:ene. 
The majlJi' user 01 LANDSAT data has ceen the fed~ral governm-ant, although 
its share of total U.S. distributions of information products has declined to about 
33 percent [20]. It is estimated that in rY83, $7 to $8 million wiH be allocated 
among federal agencies for LANDSAT data. Within the federal government, the 
iargest user is the Department of Argicuiturp. with a budget estimated to be 
slightly in p.xcess of S3.5 million in FY 33 for data acquired over foreign areas and 
$150,000 on domestic data. for the Fore Ign A~~ricultural Service, LANDS A T is the 
only way to obtain glohal crop information. In domestlc crop monitoring, 
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alternative means do exist for collecting data. Aerial photography, district !"angers, 
county agents and extension workers are used regularly, especiaUy during the 
grow ing seasons. Because of anticipted b'Jdget constraints coupled with the 
agencies use of large quantities of LANDSAT data, H is not likely to shift to the 
use of the more expensive TM dat"l on a significant scale. Timeliness of deJivery 
and frequent observations are critical to the value of the data. Based upon 
* previous benefit estimates [26-29] i~. appears that USDA budgets for information 
products bear little or no relationship to the pott:ntial benefits. 
Among the other federal government users are the CIA, Department of 
Interior, DOD and NASA. It is estimated that their combln~d FY83 expenditures 
for information products will be of the same order as the USDA's. The information 
products will be used for both renewable and nonrenewable resource management 
applica tlons. 
Stat~ and local government users constitute a smaJJ segment of the market; 
about 5 percent of the nonfederal market [20]. They are low volume users. Many 
states have d~v~loped internal data analysi!» capabilities [7]. The largest number 
of state applications have been in environmental management, torest/rangeland 
management, and water resources planning and manageJTIent [12]. Higher resolu-
tion images over urban and suburban areas are valuable to urban planners 
concerned with r:han~ing land use patterns I: 30]. 
AcademiC institutions use LANDSAT data in research or teaching. Some 
pu"chase data to perform value added services for state and local government 
organizations or other clients [12). 
The industrial sec·tor is the second largest market cate~ory and is dominated 
by the resource exploration industries-particularly oil, natural gas and mineral 
exploration companies [31]. Frequent coverage and timely delivery are not as 
vital as in the renewable resources area. UsuaJJy seasonal coverage and delivery 
within the month is adequate. During the past few years firms that have been 
actively using LANDSAT data have developed in-house processing facilities and 
have established databases with scenes acquired during each of the four seasons. It 
is possible that this part of the marl<~t may approach saturation in the near-term. 
However, new firms are beginning to employ LANDSAT data, and so the marl<et 
may be driven more by expanded number of users than by lncreased demand among 
--.. 
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existing users [20]. Counterb .lancing this trend is the worldwide petroleum glut, 
which has reduced speculative searches for new sources of petroleum. 
The industrial market is characterized by relatively low data volumes but an 
ability to pay, which bears more of a relationship to value than the other market 
segments. Data, once acql.,:ired, has value for years afterwards. The new and 
:1ilrrOWer spe(~tr3l bands of the Them~.tit; Ma!>per data will be valuable in mineral 
and f.'etr"leum p.y.ploration, a"d a ~tr.Jng :nitiill demand for T:~' data on the part of 
these users is anticlpateo. The industrial sector has expressed a desire to acquire 
stereo data which is (lot available frorn LANDSAT D and D' but wilJ be available 
from the French SPOT System. 
There has been limited operational use of multi-spectral data in the forestry 
industries. St. Regis Paper Company is now using MSS data in a forest resource 
information system [ 1]. Agribusinesses, although aware of the LANDSAT pro-
gram, have been reluctant to actively use the data [ 31 ]. A recent market study 
identifiec.' potential private users with require menU which LANDSAT now has the 
potential to fill, including utilities, construction companies, agl"ibusinesses, or 
whic.n ;~lgher resolution [v'LA systems '""ill fiU, inciuding mining engi:leering, bridge, 
tunnel and elevated highway construction contractors [311. 
Foreign users have made up about one-third of total EDe data sales. The 
composition of the foreign sector is believed to be similar to the U.S. groups 
(federal, industrial, academic, and state and local governments) and will have 
similar requirements [20). The developing countries and some developed countries 
(such as Canada, Australia to a certain degree, Brazil and South Africa, whic!1 have 
substantial areas. small but well tnined !;cie!1tific populations and economies which 
can support investments in remote sensing) place high value on the LANDSAT 
sy:a~m L 12 j. For man;' developing countries the:-e are no alternatives to 
LANDSAT's rPoliable, inexpensi"/e provision of data on natural resources. Small 
countries, cloudy countries and countries with finely segmented landscapes do not 
have much interest in the present system, but look to future spa~ecraft imaging 
radars to overcome the cloud cover problem, and to SPOT and TM for high 
resolutIon and multi-spectral da':a [12]. 
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4.3 Competition 
Starting in 1984 LANDSAT will face competition if, as is currently scheduled, 
France launches its developmtmtal satellite earth observation program, SrOT. The 
SPOT satellite will contain two identical high resolution visible (HRV) t'ange 
instruments. These instruments will have a resolution of 20 meters in three 
spectral bands (in the vi~ible and near infrared portions of the spectrum) and 10 
meters in black and white. During ground processing, 20 and 10 meter resolution 
images can be combined into a product appearing to have an enhanced resoluticn 
beyond the multispectral image. A unique feature of the SPOT imaging system is 
the off -nadir viewing capability made possible through the use of multi· linear 
arrays (MLA) of solid state c.letectors. This allows revisit coverage at interval~ 
from one to several days, and the ability to record stereoscopic pairs of images of 
a particular area. SPOT has a 26-day repeat cycle [32, 33]. 
A market for SPOT data is expected to be found among those involved in oil 
and mineral exploration, topographic and land use mapping, crop and environmental 
monitoring, coast..!l zone studies and general research activities. SPOT Image, the 
privately-owned company that will market SPOT, plans to establish agreements 
with ground stations, giving the stations exclusive rights to market SPOT within 
their own countries [33]. The payment fees to these stations are structured so a$ 
to be essentially proportional to the amount of data received by them. SPOT Image 
has tentatively priced their product (high density tape) at about $1,000 per scene • 
A SPOT scene is approximately one··fourth the area of a T~ scene (currently priced 
at $2,800) and has three spectral bands. as compared to the TM's seven. The 
implications on the market can only he gt.'essed, but it is likely that thos~ 
applications that do not have need for full TM scenes will find SPOT somewhat less 
expensive. 
4.4 Market Forecast 
The past decade has seen many major developments in the state of the art of 
land remote sensing. A space hardware and a ground data processing technology 
base have been developed. An enormous amount of data have been coilected from 
the LANDSAT sr.l.teUites and have been processed into film and tape information 
products. These information products, having applicaticn in both renewable and 
nonrenewable resource management areas, have been available to and used by both 
taderal and nonfederal customers. Considerable progress has been made toward 
the development of a good technology foundation upon which estimates and 
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projections can be made with respect to the cost and c2.~pability of data collection 
and processing. During this same time, however, little progress has been made 
with respect to understanding the market dynamics for resulting information 
products, although a number of market studies have been undertaken r 31, 34, 35, 
36]. Little information is available that relates potential sales of information 
products to the lTIultiple attribu tes $IJch a!i reso!u~:ion, nurnbfl!r of spectral bands, 
I'ric:e and competition. Because of the brief period 'f perfJrmance of thi~ reported 
study, it was not possible to develop new data-that is, it was not possible to 
perform an in-depth market study, nor was it possible to make independe.1t ~ost 
and performance estim"ltes. Since a$sessmel'lts and projections were neces:,Sary, 
thfl!Y were made based upon review of previous worl<, the establishment of 
historical costs, performance and sales databases, and interviews with both users 
and suppliers of data p.oducts. 
l\ summary of historical data is presented in Figure 4.1 and indicate~ 
thousands of MSS scenes (imagery plus tape) delivered as a function of time, Also 
indica,Elc ~re the Dr::partment of Commerce estimates of MSS scenes that will be 
deliverer.! i,n FY 1933 and 1984 [2C J. It shol,ld be nott!d that there have been 
significant ':~~nges in pricing policy over the period of time shown, culminating 
with a large price increase (approximately two to three times) in October 
1982 [301. Also, TM scenes have recently become available and will cause a 
gradual s',\itch by some usars from MSS (80 meter) to TM 00 meter) information 
products. 
The following paragraphs $ummarize the market forecasts that have been 
usC!d in the financial analyses which are pref.ented in Section 6 of this report. 
Because we have tried within the scope of the current effort to ?lay tr,e roie of an 
entrepreneur formulating a busin~ss plan. the market forecasts are felt to be 
conscrvative-"blue sky" Qi'plicatior.s h:;l.ve no-: been inc1l1dt!d. Thus, there is H\.:ely 
to be considerable upside potential with bllt limited downside riSK. Also, no 
consideration has been given to major changes in markets that m~y result from 
technology changes (for p.xample t the impact of low cost processir,g on demand has 
not been considered) or from market development. 
The market forecasts are based upon a market segmentatior. ~s indicated in 
Figure l,L.2. The market forecasts are segmented by user (federa!, indu!»trial, 
state/local government/academia and foreign), product type (tape and imagery) and 
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BY FOREIGN GROUND ~ ___ __ -----
BY EROS DATA CENTER TO 
NONFEDERAL USERS 
- ... ~-- ----- .... ---
TO FE:lERAL uSERS ~ _______ ---
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
F I SCf,L YEARS 
ESTIMATED - . -I PROJECTED 
DISTRIBUTIONS '~ DISTRIBUTIONS 
FIGLRE 4.1 GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION OF MSS DATA ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED 
FISCAL YEARS 1978 THROUGH 1984 
'* 
(SOURCE: TRANSFER OF THE CIVIL OPERATIONAL EARTH OBSERVATION SATELLITE 
TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR (DRAFT), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, JANUARY 1983) 
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resolution (30 and 80 meters). Thus forecasts have been made for 30 and 80 meter 
resolution teape and 30 and 80 meter fUm products to four market segments. It 
should again be noted tha.t the information products have many attributes including 
medium (fUm or tape), resolution, number and location of spectral bands, timeli-
ness of delivery, frequency of observation, proprietariness and dimensions of scene 
(partial scenes). It should be noted that many of these attributes have no, been 
~xp!id~ly considered ira this arlalysis primarily because of lack of data upon which 
to base forecasts. It should however be pointed out that pricing by product 
attribute (other than resolution and medium that have been explicitly considered 
herein) may prove to have grea.t impact upon projected revenues. TIlis is discussed 
in follow ing paragraphs. 
Figures 4.3 and 11.4 illustrate the revenue forecast and are based upon a 
review of previous studies as well as discussions with users, agencies and suppliers. 
Considerable judgment has been used in arriving at these figures, the rationale for 
which foHows. Figure 4.3 presents the revenue forecast in constant 1983 dollars 
and Figurt! 4.1; presents the forecast in curr\!nt dollars based upon a continuing 
6 percent ~nflatior, rate. Since commercial ventures are being evaluated, current 
dollars are used in the financial analyses. The revenue forecast is based upon the 
specific timing of events as illustrated in Figure 3.1 (most important is the 
assumed TM failure in FY 1987 and re-estabHshment of a 30 meter capabiHty io' FY 
1991), pricing policy and price elasticity estimates, market share estimates 
(assuming competition from SPOT and perhaps other sources), user transitions from 
eo to 30 meter information products and nominal demand estimates. 
The rationale !Jehir.d the forecast is as foHows: 
lli~r!L9ovEt~L~arket 
The fede!':\! sc':tor is ::haracterized by relatively stab I\! budgets which arc 
m:el}' to grow slightly (in real t'!rms) with time. This growth will be prima,rily the 
result of price increases of the information products as price adjustments are made 
towards the maximization of revenue of the /;usiness entity. Information products 
will be acquired principaUy for renewable resource applications and there is some 
but little interest or need for stereo data (this data becomes available in FY 1987). 
The basic attitude of the federal market is to "buy American." This implies a very 
high market share for a U.S. commercial corporation independent of competition 
from foreign entities. Because ot the large quantity of data required en a 
continuing baSIS for monitoring the renewable resources, it is important to acquire 
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low pric.e information products. This is the primary reason for assuming continued 
reliance upon 30 meter information. 
It i~ 3M'\med that the demand for 80 meter information products wlU remain 
r~latively constant with time. The demand is basicaHy related to renewable 
resources. Of particular importance are information products concerning foreign 
agricultural products. Although 30 meter resolution may be desirable, it is 
anticipated that the combination of large volume required and high price will, to a 
large extent preclude its use for renewable resource applications. It is assumed 
that the demand for these products wUJ continue well into the future and wiH be 
independent of the availability of higher reso:,ution inf<)rrnatlon products. It is also 
assumed that USDA's domestic agricultural reporting services will not rely upon 
remotely-sensed data. If this changes, then the demand (together with bud~ets) 
will increase, possibly by several thousand scenes per year. This would nece!ssitate 
a budget growth and is probably the only major growth area if, the federal sector. 
With respect to 30 meter data there is little or no historical data upon which 
to base forecasts because )0 meter data has not been available untl! recently. It is 
assumed that 30 meter information products will be used primarily for experi-
mentation and for nonrenewable resource applications. For these applications, 
because of the relatively small volume of data required, higher prices can be 
afforded and 30 meter information is more attractive than 80 meter Information. 
When the LANDSAT D' thema..:ic mapper fails, it is assumed that data purchases 
will continue (but at a decreasing rate) from archived data. When an operational 
thematic mapper or its 30 meter equivalent is reintroduced, 30 meter information 
product sales will pick up and prices wil! be increased as adjustments are made 
towards the maximization of revenue. Again. the basic attitude of the federal 
market is to "buy American." Because of the nonrenewable resource appJi.caticns, 
there will be some increase in demand due to the availability of stereo data. 
Industrial Market 
It is assumed that during the dl.~cade of intel"est (the ten year span of the 
financial analysis) the resource exploration industry will continue to be the primary 
source of demand for information products. The mar ket to date has been 
dominated by the resource eX[1laration companies which currently are likely to 
continue to do their own data analysis. This implies that thp. '.:ost of the data is but 
a smail fraction of the total cost. The value of data products significantly exceeds 
the price paid for th~ products. Ther~fore, prices can be increased significantly 
without reducing the revenue. 
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It is anticipated that this market wUI be s:gnUicQnt!y irnpacted by the 
avaUabiUty of )0 meter data. Therefore the demand for 80 meter products wiU 
faU off when )0 met.er data becomes avaUable from the thematic mapper. When 
stereo (SO meter) data is available, demand wlU increase unti! 30 meter stereo data 
is avaUable. Since the market can stand significantly higher prices, attribute 
pricing m;£y be ust'!d (r.ondisc:rim'natory, to ful"tl",cr increase revenue by :hal'ging 
nigher jlrlcc~. If pricl! 1s l'etQted t.o qur.ntlty ptJrCh;lS~d with signif1t:ant prke 
breaks for large quantitil!s, prices may be kept low to federal ll,ert; and high to 
industrial users. High prices would ttlen abo be charged -:0 foreign and ~ta\e/local 
users). Another alternative would be to charge by spectral bands-this is 1ll<ely to 
separate by renewable and nonrenewable resources. The effect of this type of 
pricing, though riot used in the financial analysis, is discussed in foUowing 
paragraphs. 
Industrial demand wiU continue to increase at a constant annual level. 
'\iark"t share will however decrease over time because of product availability from 
othel' :i1J~rce,\, i.e. r .:ompeti~lon from SPOT and other systems. Market share for 80 
l'l1et~r j)l·OCJI.l.-: .. s wUl staoiJjz~ at about 7n percent because of a basic ttdeslre to buy 
American. 1I 
Market share for 30 meter products will be more dIrectly affected by· SPOT 
and the unavaUi.ibiJity of new 30 meter data because of the assumed demise of 
LANDSA r 0'. Thus, market share will erode to a low of 30 percent in 1990 before 
again increasing and stabilizing at about 60 percent. 
,gate/Local Government/Academia 
This industry segment is characterized by reJatively small budgets for the 
acqJisition of informati"n products. It is anticipated thilt budgets will increase 
slowly with time as the value 'Jf the information products becomes an accepted 
fact. Information prouucts will be used pr'imarily for j",,mrenewable resource 
applications ilnd for research. Because of the large area covered by a scene and 
slow changes being observed, a relatively small dernand is forecast. It is 
anticipated that 30 meter products will be desired but that due to the relatively 
high price and fixed budgets, a relatively large quantity 01 80 meter products will 
be acquired. It is anticipated that the bulk of the information products will be 
purchased from a U.S. source. 
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Foreign Market 
The foreign market consists of franchising foreign ground stations and 
receiving annual user fees and the sale of information products through these 
ground stations. It is assumed that the number of franchised ground stations wUI 
remain relatively constant over the next decade. It is assumed that maintaining and 
demonstratIng continuity of data wiU be important in maintaining an active 
franchise operation. 
It is assumed that the foreign ground stations wUI seU information products 
that they cannot receive by dJrect readout. These information products wiH be 
obtained from the U.S. or'ganization. It is assumed that 2' rercent of the revenue 
obtained from these sales by the foreign ground stations will be kept by the ground 
stations and 7' percent of the revenue wiU be paid to the U.S. organization for ~he 
informatiCln products. 
It is assumed that the foreign demand for 80 meter information products wiU 
continue to grow for several years and wiU then stabilize. If foreign countries 
decide to acquire worldwide renewable: resource data (such as lISDA', Forelgn 
Agriculture Service does) this demand could increase significantly. It is assumed 
that competitive systems wiU make significant inroad~ with respect to market 
share. 
Similar forecasts apply for 30 meter information products. Very significant 
growth is forecast in this area. However, market 5hare wiH be significantly eroded 
by competition and the lack of new 30 meter data resulting from the gap caused by 
failure of LANDSA T D' and the launching of LANDSAT F. 
In summary, it is anticipatl!d that revenue froln SO meter information 
products will remain relatively constant ov~r' the next decade, This is the result of 
a combination of many factors including a slow growth In basic demand for 
renewable resource applications, the availability of 80 meter stereo data, competi-
tion from other systems and the availability of 30 meter information products. It 
should be noted th~t the use of sateHite data by the USDA domestic reporting 
serv ices could change th is forecast substantially. Also, the use of war Idw ide crop 
information on a continuous basis by other nations could also substantially increase 
the forecast. It is anticipated that revenue from 30 meter information products 
wUl increase substantially over the next decade. The growth will be significa.,Uy 
affected by an anticipated gap in the avallabHlty of new 30 meter information 
products (this is the primary reason for the dip (1988-1990) in 30 meter revenue) 
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and competition from other sateUhe systems. It has been assumed that there will 
be only one U.S. orgallization providing Information products. More will be ~aid 
about this in Section 8. 
The r~venue forecan 1s based upon the detaUed data presented in Figures 4.' 
and 4.6 (aU in constant 1983 doUars) for 80 meter and 30 meter information 
products, rupectivt.!Jy, and the price ela,t:city estimates presentea in Figures 4.7 
and 4.8. (:idce. elasticity was established by esumoting the quantity which Ivould oe 
sold at three different price levels. Two straight lines are passed through the "Chr~e 
points a:l illustrated In Figure 4.7 thus establishing the pric~-quantity relationship. 
The specific estimates utiHzed 41'e presented in Figure 4.7 tand illustrated ~raphi­
clllly in Figure 4.8. 
Referring to Figure 4.8, the dotted curves Indicate unit elastidties or 
constant annual budgets (l.e., price x quantity = annual budget). When the soUd 
curves are above the dotted curves 11: is impUed that budgets will be increased to 
accommodate price Increases. It is thus evident that the federal users have been 
4ssumc:d t·:') be budget constrained within a )'ear (it I:; assumed that budget3 ,=an 
VCJ~y II".,m year to year as inclr.ated by the nominal prices and quantities in 
Figures 4 •. ~ and 4.6. However, as prices are varied from their nominal values, 
quantities are adjusted according to the assumed elasticitie!l). As prices incre~'ie, 
quantities demanded decrease by approximately the same amount. This is ill 
contrast to the industrial sector where it is assumed thM significant price 
increases will have but little effect on demand. The state/local govern-
ment/academia segment is aJso assumed to be budget constrained but to il slightJy 
les~er degree (because of dlver!ilty) than the feder3J sector. The foreign sector, 
assumed to be a composit~ of tile three oth~r sectors, is assumed to have some 
::udgct fJey,mi!iT.Y but less th~\n that of tne industrial sector. 
,\ few cornments must be made with respect to optirnum pricins, that is, 
pricing to maximize revt:nue. The optimum price: iJ established by finding the point 
of tangency of the c",v·tallt budget (by varying the budget level) curve with the 
price ela:;ticity cur" ,"esented in Figure 4·.3. Assuming that nondiscriminatory 
attribute pricing C ... ,I De achieved so that the optimum price can be charged in each 
market segment, then the price and revenue as indicated in Table 4.1 can be 
achieved. Table 4.1 indicates optimal price to the federaJ sector is 2.' times the 
nominal price used in the analysis with a resulting revenue of 1.25 times that 
assumed. The net effect of such optimum pricing (across aU market segments) 
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TABLE 4.1 OPTIMUM PRICE & RESULTING REVENUE (RELATI VE) 
Ir~AGERY TAPE 
r~ARKEi SECTOR 
PRICE REVENUE PRICE REVENUE 
FEDERAL 2.5x 1.25x 2.5x 1 .25x 
INDUSTRIAL 3.7x· 2.5x'" 4.2x 2.6x 
STATE/LOCAL/ACAD. 2.2x 1. 4x 2.2x 1. 4x 
FOREIGN 2.5x 1. 9x 3.0x Lax 
* A PRICE INCREASE RELATIVE TO THE NOMINAL PRICE OF 3.7 TIMES RE-
SULTS IN A REVENUE INCREASE OF 2.5 TIMES. 
would be to approximately double the estimated total revenue. While this looks 
very tempting there are problems: competition will generally drive these prices 
down as will lack of knowledge of the true price-elasticity curves. Therefore, the 
conservative pricing policy indicated in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, and modified by 
inflationary increases, was assumed with the gradual incr~ase in prices assumed to 
seek out the optimum whlle countering competition and minimizing budgetary 
process problems particularly among federal, state and local government users. 
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,. FINANCIAL/ORGANIZATIONAL SCENARIOS (GENERAL) 
As state-i previously, the ECON efforts were concerned with the analysis and 
comparison of a limited number of financial and organizational approaches for 
either transfer of the ownership and operation of the civil operational land remote 
sensing program to the private sector or government retention. The following 
basic approaches for commercialization or retention were considered: 
1. Continued ownership and operation by the federal government (planned 
phase-out) 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Continued ownership and opel· at ion by the federal government (estab-
lishment of the necessary budgetary line items) 
Wholly privately-owned and operated by an entity competitively se-
lected 
Phased private ownership (government ownership and operation with 
private sector rnarl<eting) 
.s. Legislatively-chartered, privately-owned corporation. 
Each of these scenarios is described in the following paragraphs. Each of the 
scenarios is based upon the schedule of events as indicated in Figure 3.1 and the 
market and revenue forecasts as described in Section 4. 
One of the most controversial issues surrounding commercialization is that of 
subsidies. Subsidies can take a variety of forms: direct cash subsidy payments; 
federal loans or loan guarantees; guaranteed federal purchases of information 
products at a unit price significantly higher than charged to other users; provision 
of free services such as sateUite launches; special tax incentives; or other. The 
Admin.istration has indicated its opposition to subsidization for commercial civil 
remote sensing on several grounds including [8]: 
• Any form ·of subsidization (whether increasing cash outflow or reducing 
revenues) is opposed on the basis of budgetary impact on the efforts to 
balance the budget 
• Subsidization in this area would set undesirable precedents in other 
areas 
!iii If a commercialization initiative cannot stand the test of the market-
place, it should not be established at all. 
Th.is analysis of the various commercialization alternatives was jointly 
concerned with government cash flows as well as with the financial viability of the 
commercial endeavors (the feasibility of obtaining funding as well as continuing 
profitable operations). Because of the anticipated limited market for land remote 
r • seQ .:!""I:3;l'&~::::"'~;::'~ .. 
f 
37 
sensing information products, combined with the possible competition from remote 
sensing systems owned by or subsidized lJy foreign governments and the capital 
intensive nature of the business, it is shown in Section 6 that viable commerciallz11-
tion endeavors !!:! Q21 Hkely to be established without significant federal partici-
pation, either in the form of ,ubsidies or major ownership/operations roles. 
Again it is not possible to consider all !ubsidiozatian forms or all le'lels oi 
governmer.t \')wnenh~p/(')peration. The 5pecific subsidization forms considered 
include direct cash subsidy payments, equipment transfer values and recoupment 
polide~, and government equity participati'ln. The method of determining the need 
for subsidies and the specific form ot the subsidies are described in Section 6. 
'three different levels of government participation were considered, namely: a) no 
participation except for possibly R&D and other support services, b) owner-
ship/operation of the ground and space segments, excluding the marketing and sales 
functions, and c) ownership/operation of the ground and space segments including 
the marketing and sales functions. 
~.l f£!!tin'Jed O\lfncrship etnd Operation by the Federal Government (Planned 
.aJ.ase-Out) 
Shortly after President Reagan entered office it was announced that the 
Administration would terminate the commitment to land remote sensing satellite 
data continuity through the 1980s on the basis that 
It is the Administration's judgment that the present NASA investment 
in l.ANDSA T is sufficient to permit evaluation of operational uses of 
l.ANDSA T data, and if these uses are cost-effective to attract a 
private sector owner/operator. 
NASA's program to develop, launch and test the two additional satel-
l1tes already m"mufactured (l.ANDSA T D and D'> will continue as 
previously planned. Expansion and extension of the U.S. civil land 
remote sensing program beyond that already funded by NASA is 
inconSistent with the need for across the board fiscal restraints •••• 
The two additional satellites, frequently referred to as l.ANDSAT Oil AND Oil', 
then were deleted from the budget [8]. 
The implication of the above is that the federal government would continue 
to fund the ground and space segments and the related sales activities associated 
with remote sensing until 'the demise of l.ANDSAT 0' or shortly thereafter (l.e., 
--~-I-·~ :!~ 
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sales wUl most likely continue for the short-term). The annual cost associated with 
. * this planned phase-out scenario can be stated in general as 
Annual Fed. Cov't. Cost(J) = Operating Cost(J) + Storage Cost of D'm 
+ Launch Cost of D'm + R&D Cost(J) 
+ Cov't. Purchases from Other Sources{I) 
- Ciov't. Revenue from Nongov't. Sources(I) 
+ Interest on Debt(l) M Tax Revenue(I). 
This is restated in Table '.1 together with the government cost computations 
resulting from the other considered commercialization and retention scenarios. 
The tax revenue results from taxation of private sector profits resulting from the 
government expenditures in the private sector. The interest on debt is the interest 
that must be paid by the federal government on borrowings made to cover the 
outlays made for the system. It can be shown that to a first order approximation, 
considering the magnitude of all of the other cost elements, the interest on debt 
and the generated tax revenue, which tend to offset one another, may be 
** neglected. 
As per the schedule of events indicated in Figure 3.1, it is anticipated that 
LANDSA T 0' will fail in the late 19805 (FY87 or FY8S). Therefore, government 
operating costs asso~iated with the operations of the land remote sensing system 
would be reduced to zero during this time period. However, government costs wUl 
.!l2! reduce to zero after the demise of LANDSAT 0'. The reason for this is that 
government agencies will most likely continue to purchase information products 
from other sources. It can be argued that these purchases need not be made, and 
that federal budgets associated with land remote sensing can be eliminated. The 
counter to this argument is that there are benefits associated with the use of the 
remotely sensed data. These may be in the form of direct cost savings or other 
indirect benefits. These benefits will be foregone if the remotely sensed data is 
not used. If it is assumed that the benefits wiU exceed the cost of the information 
* . I represents tIme, years. 
** Tax Revenue = 0 • .5 x Cov't. Cost x Return on Sales(96)/ I 00 
Interest on Debt = Cov't. Cost x Interest Rate(96)/ 1 00 
Interest on Debt - Tax Revenue = [Interest Rate(96) - 0 • .5 x Return on Sales(96)] 
x Cov't. Cost/ 1 00 
= [8% - 0 • .5 x 10%] x Cov't. Cost/ 1 00 
Therefore, neglecting interest on debt and generated tax revenues may 
introduce an error of 3 to 4 percent. 
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TABLE:,l DETERMINATION OF r.QVERNMENT COSTS • 
SCEN,Il.R I 0 •• COST COMPUTATION 
~-----------------------+------------------------------------.---1 
1. GOVERNMf.NT CI·MRStllP A,':,) 
OPER~ nON (P~:,!,;flED PHII$E 
OUT) 
,. GO\/~R',IIENr eWrlt~SfltP ~.tIO 
O'JE?ATfON lCG'-;r:llllED JII". 
ERSHIP A'I~ ()FEf(.':'T10~) 
OPERATI~G COST(!) + STORAGE COST or D'(l) 
+ lAUNCH COST 0r D' (I) • R&u COST(II 
• GOVE~NMfNT PURCHA~~ FRO~ OTrlFR SOU~CES(I) 
• GO ~ERNI1EN T REVPIUE FROr~ liOt/GO\'£ RNr~E:I j SOl/ReF,S ( I ~ 
+ INTERES! ON ~EBT(I) " TAX REVENUE(I) 
S~Ae[ SE5~ENT eCST!I; + GROUND SEGIENT ~OST(I) 
~, INTeP.ES: ~rr OCe1(1) • T/IX FF.oIE'WE(l) 
• INDUSTRIAL SALES: I I • 3TA'E/~0C~l ~O~ERNM~Nr/ACtD. 
SALES(I) . FG~EIG~ SALE~(:) • USER FEE~(II 
.. R&D COS r( I) 
~-----------------------+----------.-------------.-----------.... ,---. 
3, P~:VATE )\ofNERZHIP ;.rID 
OPERATION 
GO'/~~N;.1ENT PAY~EtIT Foe itli'ORllATI'Jt! OROl'UC.T!.ili) 
~ 0PERATIO~S COSTS( I: . LfASC ~AfMENTSI I) 
· AZSET ~ECOUPMENT PAYMENTS(I) - TDRSS 
C~ST(I/ . PROFIT SHARI~G OR ROYALTY ON 
SAlES(I) ~ SUBSIDY PAYMENTS(I) 
+ R~D COST(I: + INTEREST ON DEBTII \ 
L . GENER4TED TAX REVENUE(I) 1-:- PHASECl PRIV;;~'-I)-W-N-ER-S-H-IP--""'-G-·o-VF.;';rn PAYMENT cOR INFORMATION PRODUCTS( I) 
(?~I'IATE St::Cl'~R ~'AR~E7!NI3) + OPE~f.710NS COSTS( I) 
· PROFIT SHA~ING OR MQYALTY Ot! SAlES(l) 
· GUARANTEED PAYMENTS(I) • R&~ COST(I) 
• INTEREST ON JEST(I) • GENERATED TAX REVENUE{I) 
~--------.-'-----------~"-~L~-----------""'---_______ . ____________ ~ 
_. ,;;~H5ur:"/rLY CH,IRTlK£O. ';OVERltMEIiT PA'fMENT FOR :rjFO~Nf.TION PROaUCTSl1 j 
rr'l vt. iEI.Y ,TvlflEr) r::lR'>OR'.';'ION + C"EP,lT:OflS COSTS III . I.EASE ?AY~~~NTS(!) 
• ASSET RECOUPMENT PAYMENTSII) . TDRSS 
COST{I) . PR0FIT SHARING OR ROYALTY ON 
SALE~(I) • SUBSIDY PAYMENTS: I) .. R&D 
COST(I) • GEflEkATED TAX REVfNUE(I) 
L + INTERf:')T 0;' DEBT!!) .. l'iJlJ!T'I PtlRCHASE( 1) 
L 
. :1IVIIJUHlS( I) 
.-',ll S-CENIIRIOS UT!LIZE --1.-- _., 
nlE SA~E REVENUE FORECAST . 
•• t REPRFSENTS T1MF. PERIODS (I E . YEARS). 
- -------------------------
pr'Jduct5 (this a.p?F.:ars to :'e d. valid assumption since, if tnis were 1\01: ·the case, uny 
form of commerci~Hzation would nO'L be seriotJsly con~idered) then rhe cost to the 
g,)verr.ment a.nd/or the gt'nerat publk (not neces~arily in the {om, of budge'£ary 
iterns} aiter t.hf! dernls~ of lA~nSAT D' Nil! eGual or exceed the cost o! the 
forecasted fed~ral governmen', purchases of information products. This is illlJsM 
trated conceptually in FlgLIre 5.1 and Guantitative results are presented in 
Section 6.1. 
5.2 Continued OwrL~ship and Opera.tion.'?y te_Fe.ct.~al GovernmenUE~tablish",:" 
ment of th~_Ne_~~!L~.!:Jdget line l~. 
It is a.ssumed fOl' this scenark') that a government organization is established 
for providing land remote sensing operations on a conth"Jing basis. It is 
i, 
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riME, VPS 
(A) REVENUE FORECAST 
I 
I 
OR.to.iINPll P;'\\1:Z ! 3 
OF POOR QUAliTY 
TOTAL REVENUE 
} STATE/LOCAL/ACADEMIC 
t INDUSTRY 
I FOREIGN 
~ LANDSAT D· NO 
1 
LONGER OPERATIONAL 
",.",.-~ 
\~ ./ 
I', GOVT. DATA 
, PURCHASES 
TIME. VRS 
(B) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COST 
FIGURE 5.1 SCENARIO 1: GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP & OPERATION (PLANNeD 
PHASE-OUT) 
assumed that the operations are based upon the event schedule presented in 
Figure 3.1. It is assumed tl.at the government organization is similar to that which 
would be established by the private sector as per the business venture description 
presented in Section 3. This organization will have a market orientation simUar to 
that of the private sector. The organization will have complete responsibiUty for 
the space segment (including maintaining continuity of service), the ground 
processing segment and marketing and sales (including archiving). 
It is likely that differences in organizational efficiency and management 
objectives will exist between government and private sector "'perations. These 
differences, if they exist, are difficult to quantify. No attempt was made as pa.rt 
of this study to quantify thp.se differences. An important area where differences 
are likely to exist is in marketing and sa.1es. Private sector market orientations 
differ significantly from that of the government. F~r example, the private sector 
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is used to providing incentives (commis~lons, bonuses, stock options, etc.) to 
encourage higher productivity from a marketing organization-the gove-rnment 15 
not. To achieve comparable performance, it is llkeJy that a government organiza-
tion would have to consider simUar incentives to those avaUabJe in the pr ivate 
sector. 
The cost 0;. continuing &overnment I)wne-nhip and operation of a land r~mote 
sensing system may be expressed as follows: 
AnnuAl Fed. Cov't. Cost(I):r Space Segment Cost(I) + Ground Segmel,t 
Cost(J) + R&D C05tCI) - Industrial 
Sales(J) - State-/Local Gov't./ 1\cademlr: 
Sales(J) - Foreign Sc\'e~«) - User Fees(I) 
+ Interest I)n Debt{l) - Tax Revenue(I). 
For the reasons pr~vious'y discussed, the net effect of interest on debt and tax 
revenu~ is assumed smaH and not quantified. AU of the other costs and r(l!venue 
items are quantified and are estabUshed in Section 6.1. 
5.3 Wholly Private Ownership and Operation by an EntitY Competitively Selected 
The private ownershi~ and operation scenario is based upon providing 
:t:.ntinuous land remote sensmg observation and resulting information products on a 
continu~ng basis. Commercialization is assumc:d to commence at the start of FY g, 
with a11 space, ground processing and marketing and sales being accompJlshed by or 
for the private sector organization. It is assumed that initiaHy existing grr=ond 
processing facUities at Goddard Space Flight Center, and archiving and processing 
facilities at EDC will continue to be utHized. These operations will be integrated 
into a common facilities at White Sands during FY89. 
It is assumed that the private sector venture will utilize existing lANOSA T 
satellites and will, as indicated in Fil~ure 3.1, phase mto th~ acquisition and 
operation of other 5ateUit~5. It is genendly ilsl:lum~d ir. the financial analY5\'!s that 
the ground processing facilities at CSFC "nd EDC (until FY89) ar~ 1eilSed by the 
private sector and that the LANDSAT 0 and 0' satellites are acquired on a title 
transfer basis. The effect of lease payments and recoupment payments is 
investigated by considering the conditions of: a) fuB repayment (to the govern-
ment) based upon estimated book value at the time of title transfer or lease rate 
establishment, and b) no recoupment by the government (i.e., a furm of subsidy) for 
government assets utilized 1n the pnvate sector operations. 
The effect of and the need for annual cash subsidies is also considered. 
Annual subsidies are established (for both the full re~oupment and no recoupment 
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cases discussed above) by determining the revenue required in order to achieve 
annual returns on capital that would be necessary to attract capit~l from the 
capital market. The dl1ference between forecasted revenue and required revenue' 
is then the required annual subsidy. 
The general approach for analyzing the private ownership and operation 
scenario is illustrated in Figure '.2. The financial analysis develops pro forma 
income statements, cash !low projections and balance sheets. The inputs to the 
analysis (described in detail in Section 6) are the demand or revenue forecast; the 
. schedule of events; fixed and variable costs associated with processing, archiving 
and sales; capital items including value, timing and depreciation lives; tax 
structure data and other re\ated information. Also speCified are desired return on 
assets, desired discounted return on investment, debt equity structure, and the 
lease/transfer options. The result of the financial analysis is the deterrn: ,alion of 
financial performance measures such as annual after-tax profit, annual cash flow, 
capital requirements, return on assets, payback period and subsidy requirements. 
The parameter, are thus those of Q business entity which is viable from the point of 
view of the financial community-i.e., it is likely that the necessary funding would 
be available. 
DES'RED RETUKN • Ot! CAPITAL 
DESIRED ROI • 
DEB1 EQUI TV .. 
STRUCTURE 
L.EASE/TRANSfER .. 
OPTION 
INCOME CASH FLo\~ 
STATEMENT PROJECTION 
BALANCE 
SHc.ET 
• ANNUAL AFTER TAX PROfiT 
• MmUAL CASH FLOW 
• CAPITAL REOUIREMENTS 
• RETURN ON CAPITAL 
• RETURN ON ASSETS 
• PAYBACK PERIOD 
e SUBSIDY REQUIREMENT 
• PRESENT VALUE 
.. - DEMAND 
FORECfST 
• SCHEDULE OF EvE~TS 
• FIXED & VARIABLE COSTS 
TAX STRUCT~P.E 
FIGURE 5.2 ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND OPERATION SCENARIO 
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As in the previous cases, government costs are aiso incurred. The annual 
government cost associated with the land remote sensing system may be expressed 
as foHows: 
Annual Fed. Govlt. Cost(J) :I Govlt. Payment for Information Produt.:ts(l) 
+ Operadons Costs(l} • Lease ?oyments(I) 
- Asset Recouprnent Poyments(U 
• TORSS C~st(I) + R&D COStO) 
• Profit Sharing or Royp..ltv on Sales(l) 
+ SlIDsidy Paymenu(l) ... Interest 0'1 
Debt(l) - Cenerated Tax Revenue(J). 
Gen\!rated tax revenue consists, in this case, of two components-the first resulting 
from government expenditures In the private sector and the second resulting from 
the profitabUity of the commerciaJ venture established for transfer of the remote 
senSing system. For the reasons previously discussed, the net effect of interest on 
debt and tax revenue (the first component) is assumed small and not quantified. 
AU of the other cC)sts and revenue hems are presented In Section 6.2. 
'.4 Phased Private Ownershl (Government Ownership and Operation With Pri-
vate Sector Marketing 
Tl",c "hased private ownership scenario is based upon government ownership 
and op'!ru'don of the space segment and the ground processing system, with the 
private sec:tor venture concerned specificaUy with the marketing and sales of 
information products. This is basically the same as the government C)wnership and 
operation (continued ownership and operation) scenario as described In Section '.2, 
with the exception that the marketing and saJes operations are performed by the 
private sector. The interface is thus the provision of requested information 
products from the government to the marketing and saies organization. The 
marketin~ and sales organization wiU be granted an exc1\!siv~ franchise to market 
and sell The information productS to U.~. government agenci~3 ~fld nongovernment 
use"s. It would also markeot arid :\eU to foreign users and would rnamtain the 
assoc.iation with the foreign ground stations coUecting th~ ground station fees. 
For the provision of information products, the private venture makes 
payments to the government. It is assumed that these payments take the form of a 
royalty on sales with a minimum guaranteed !n!l.4!! e!l:!!!~ ~!!2!!! the private 
sector !9. !h.! government. The magnitud~ of this guarantee ami the royalty 
percentage- (competitively established) could serve as the basis for a competitively 
s~lected marketing and sales organization. rhe royalty payments would be made 
for information products having specified and agreed-to attributes. Guarantees 
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would have to be made by the government that these products would be avaUable 
as agreed. Penahles would be imposed if the agreed-to information products were 
not provided. 
From the private venture's point of view the guarantee level could be 
established such that the present value of net cash !low, including the guarall!ee 
payments, is equal to zero at a desired return on investment. This concept is 
illustrated in Figure '.J. 
Thls scenario has the apparent advantage of letting the private sector do 
what it knows best, i.e., marketing and !iales. It requires the government to 
continue the ownership and operation of the remainder of the remot" sensing 
system, I,:, particula.r, those items neceSSitating • .arge expenditures which the 
private sector may not be wUHng to mal<e in any event without large subsidies. 
The annual government cost associated with the land remote sensing system 
may be expressed as foUows: 
Annual Fed. Cov't. Cost(J) = c.ov't. Payments for Information ProdtJcts(J) 
+ Operations Cosu(J) + R&D Cost(J) 
- Profit Sharing or Royalty on Siiles(l) 
- Guaranteed Payments(I) 
+ Interest on Debt(() - Generated Tax 
Revenue((). 
As discussed in Section '.3, the general tax revenue consists of two components. 
The first resulting from government expenditures in the private sector, and th" 
second resulting from the profltabiUty of the commercial venture. For the reasons 
previously discussed, the net effect of interest on debt and tax revenue (the first 
component) is a:5sumed smaU and not quantified. AU of the other cost and revenue 
items are quantified and are indicated in SectIon 6.3. 
, • .5 Legislatively-Chartered, Privately-Owned Corporation 
From the financial analysis point of view the legislatively-chartered, pri-
vat'ely-owned corporation is similar to the private ownership scenario discussed in 
Section .5.3. The major difference is concerned with the equity structure of the 
corporation. It is assumed that the federal government pu(chases equity in the 
corporation. This is in effect a form of subsidy. Altering the debt equity structure 
affects interest rates and the overall cost of capital. TheSE: effects are taken into 
account in the Hnancial analysiS and the results presented in Section 6.4 • 
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.'\, in the previou~ cas"s/ government costs are also include1. The annual 
government cost associated with the land remote sensing system may be expressed 
as foUows: 
Annual Fed. Govlt. Cost(l) = Govlt. Payment for Information Products(t) 
+ Operations Costs(J) - lease Paymentsm 
- Asset Ri:coupment Payments(l) 
- TDRSS Cost(l) + R&D Cost(I) 
- Profit Sharing or Royalty on Sales((} 
+ Interest on Debt(I) - Cenerated Tax 
Revenue(J) + Subsiav Paym~i1ts(l) 
+ Equity Pu:-ch3se(1) - Dividends(I). 
All of the cost and revenue Items are quantHlt!d '.ind are Ir.dicated In Section 6.4. 
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6. FINANCIAL ISSUES 
As stated previously, we have taken the position that in order to evaluate the 
approaches for commercialuation or retention it is necessary to plan potential 
business ventures and evaluate their financial merit, th~ likelihood of their 
financing and their impact on government cas., ~lows. We have tried to play the 
role of an ent.repreneur, putting together business plans for the purpose of 
obtaining financing. The business plans are based upon a perceived technology 
base, a market forecast, cost and capital expenditure estimates, ar.d a specific 
business system. The market f-Jrecast is based upon a review of previous market 
studies and discussions with the user community. The cost and capital expenditure 
t!stim."'tes were, in most cases, based upon estimated historical costs. No attempt 
was made to verify the accuracy of these cost data nor was an att\!mpt made to 
address the issue of government overhead rates. With respect to the business 
scenario, from the large array of possibiHtie~ a particular scenario (as described in 
Section 3) was selected and used as the basis for planning and evaluating each of 
the approachf;s for commercialization or retention. This allows al1 of the 
approaches for commercialization or retention to be evaluated on a common basis 
and compared. 
The analysis process followed is summarized in Figure 6.1. The first step was 
the formulation of the overall business plan which encompassed considerations of 
products, schedules, technology availability and nonfinancial issues. Ground 
segment costs and space seg' nent costs were estimated. Ground segment costs 
were developed for processing, archiving and communications-both fixed and 
variable costs were developed. Space segment costs considered both nonrecurring 
and recurring costs and the phasing in of different sensors over time. The SA TIL 
probabilistic life cycle costing model (see Appendix A) was used to verify estimates 
of the quantity of satellites required. 
Demand and revenue forecasts were made in terms of information product 
type and market segment. A pricing policy was postulated and together with price 
elasticity estimates (by market segment and prodlJct type) were used in a Market 
Model to establish demand and revenue forecasts. The revenue forecas'ts together 
with the ground and space segment costs were used in the financial analysis (a 
financial analysis model was specifically developed for this purpose) to develop pro 
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1. Government ownership and :>peration (planned phase-out) 
2. l;overnment owncrship and operation (continued ownership and opera-
tion) 
3. Private ownership and operation 
4. Phased private ownership (government ownership and operation with 
private sector marketing) 
,. l..eglslaUveJy-chartered, privately-owned corporation (goverrllnent 
equity position). 
As a separate and distinct lillld remott: sensing ent~rfJrise does not currently exist, 
some r,lstorical data was not avaHable as a basis for the projections. Thel'cfore 
portions of the data used as a basis for the financial projections were estimated 
based upon the best information available at this time. The projections reflect, in 
our judgment, the single most probable result for each scenario projected. Each 
financial projection contains up to six parts as follows: 
1. D~,ta Set (appJles with slight modifications to aU scenarios) 
2. Projected Statement of Income 
3. Projected Balance Sheet 
q.. Pn"jth-:ted Statement of Changes in Financial Position 
.5. PrOjected Cash FloVi 
6. Projected U.S. Government Cash Flows. 
Part 1 - "Data Set" (Refer to Financial Exhibit 6.0) 
In preparing a financial projection, as in preparing comparative projections, it 
is necessary to dcvelop key basic assumptions upon which the projections are 
prepared. Although each scenario reflects alternative operating and capital 
assumptions, the basic assumptions with regard to costs and revenue are consistent 
in order to provide for an effective comparisol". Supporting data to quantitl~s used 
in t.he data set are ccntained in Appendix B of this report. 
Direct costs reiiected in the data set are semi-variable and variable costs 
attributed to proceSSing, archiving and sales of remotely sensed data on a per scene 
basis. A learning factor and a processing to scenes factor is also applied. Although 
certain noncapital operating costs at EDC, Goddard and White Sands facilities are 
semi-variable, all costs have been treated as variable for purposes of this 
pro jection. 
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R~'<O and marketing costs are reflected in the data set as both a fixed 
minimum cost/year, as well as a percentage of revenue. This results in a semi-
variable cost treatment dependent upon the projected revenue level. Com-
munication costs for both TDRSS and OOMSA T have been treated as variable costs 
although certain costs are fixed. Variable and non variable ground facilities and 
equipment are assumed to be leased from the U.S .. government through 1988 with 
alternative facilities and equipment leased from third partie~ after 1988. Fixed 
assets with the exception of l.ANDSA T D and 0' have been depreciated on a four 
year straight line basis with full year depreciation taken in the year p1acI'!d in 
service. LANDSAT D and 0' are depreciated on a straight line basis over thei:' 
remaining useful lives (one year and 3 years respectively). 
Construction payment schedules for satellites generally assume a three to 
five year construction period with 12 percent of the total payment due four years 
before the sateUite is delivered, 16 percent due three years before, 24 percent due 
two years before, 16 percent due one year before, and 32 percent due at launch. 
Construction payments include storage and cost of launch and are capitalized in 
the year incurred. 
Cash requirements for Balance Sheet operating purposes are predicated upon 
an assumed number of days in terms of revenue for operating cash, accounts 
receivable and accounts payable. A fixed amount of contributed capital is 
reflected over the entire ten year projection with a cost of borrowing at an 
estimated 11 percent long-term borrowing rate. 
Investment tax credits are taken on :'lpace segment assets during con-
struction. It is assumed that 60 percent of annual R&D expenditures qualify for 
the R&D tax credit (a 60% x 2.5% R&D tax credit = 1.5% net credit). Royalties paid 
to the U.S. government are based upon a percentage of data sales with a minimum 
base royalty. 
Part 2 - "Projected Statement of Income'~ 
The Projected Statement of IncolTle provides for the results of operations for 
the profit seeking alternative scenarios during a ten year period. The Income 
Statement and the derived cash flow may be considered to be the most important 
statement for purposes of evaluating the worth of the enterprise from the 
standpoint of investment value. Although a clear cut definition of an income 
statement is seldom found, one may simplistically describe it as a presentation "f 
-
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revenue and cost predicated upon consistent accounting assumptions. The differ-
ence between revenues and costs derive nct income which is used as a measure as 
to the financial success of the enterprise. A typical (simplified) profit and cash 
flow computation procedure is illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
The Projected Statements of Income contained in this report were prepared 
consistent with the key assumptions reflected and described in the data set and 
Appendlx B. 
Tb~ before tax profit on operations is detel'l1linfl:d by subtracting th~ 
projected costs and expen!;cs from the projected ,"eVellues. FeC::eral taxes are 
deducted from the before tax profit at a !"ate of .51 percent. If the before tax 
profit is negative (a loss) the federal tax loss carry forward is treated as a benefit 
in the current year, reducing the reported loss. Current year investment and R&D 
tax credits are treated in the same manner. As this is not a r;ash inflow, 
adjustments are reflected on the cash flow statement. 
Part 3 - "Projected Balance Sheet" 
The Projected Balance Sheets presented depict the value of the various 
enterprises on the basis of proj~cted revenues, costs, borrowings and contributed 
capital. Although the significance of a Projected Balance Sheet is not as important 
as a Projected Income Statement for making investment decisions, it is a valuable 
supplement to the information contained in the Statement of Income. More 
specifically, the Balance Sheet depicts the value of the enterprise in terms of 
assets, at cost, its liabilities and the equity of the shareholders at a given point in 
time. 
Part 1+ - "Projected Statement of Changes in Financial Posit,ion" 
The Projected Statement of Changes in Working Capitill reflects changes in 
the war!<ing capital of the enterprise from operating year to operating yt!ar. 
Working cc.pit31 may be defined as current assets less cu:-rent lia.bilities. The 
purpose 01 this statement is to provide an explanation 01 what provided working 
capital during each year and how working capital was applied during each year. In 
other words, the statement depicts whether or not sufficient working capital is 
provided by operations; if not, it indicates which sources are being utilized to 
provide working c.'lpital for continued operation of the enterprise. 
Part 5 - "Projected Cash Flow" 
This statement a) reflects sources of cash (net income, increases in current 
liabilities, etc.), b) applications of cash (Josses, increases in fixed assets, accounts 
, #4 (t)' 
•  
FIGURE 6.2 SIMPLIFIED PRO~IT AND CASH FLOW COMPUTATIONAL PROCEDURE 
receivable, etc.) The difference between the sources and appHcations is the net 
annual cash flow of the enterprise. 
This statement is similar in nature to the Projected Statement of Changes in 
Financial Position except that operating funds are analyzed in terms of increases 
or decreases to cash from operations of the enterprise. Nonoperating sources l,f 
cash such as contributed capital and borrowed capital are not included. Nonoperat-
ing applications of cash such as dividend distributions are also excluded. 
This statement also reflects adjustments for the noncash nature of the tax 
credits and loss carry forwards obtained in the ear ly years of the venture. 
Although these credlts were reflected on the Income Sta~ement, Balance Sheet and 
Statement of Changes in Financial Position as credits in the year they were earned, 
no cash was actually received-credits would actually be carried forward and offset 
against future tax Habilities. 
The <.. 3h flow stream is discounted at various rates and the present value I,)f 
the venture is determined by summing the discounted values. Present value ",," is 
the sum of the discounted cash flows for the years 1985-1994. Present value "B" is 
the sum of the discounted cash flows from 1995 to infinity, assuming that the 
annual cash flow in each of those years is the same as it is projected to be in 1994. 
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Three key financ::ial ratlos of the venture are also shown. The return on 
capitahzation is maintained at a value of 17 percent by adjustments to the 
"additional federal p'Jfchases" Hne. Capital market experts have indicated that a 
"utility" of this type should have the capability of maintaining at least this rate of 
return. 
Part 6 - "Proit!ctt,d !J.S. Government C.uh FICiW~" 
The cash flow de-scribed in the preceding section is that e>:r}erienced by a 
commercial venture. Each of the five scenarios will result in a government cash 
flow impact. Dependent upon which !Scenario is examined the nature of tne 
government cash flow will contain a subset of the following: 
Cash outflows: 
• Expenditures for information products, i.e., purchases of tapes and 
films 
• 
• 
Possible purcha~es of spa.cecratt and ground-based facilities 
Costs for operations such as spacecraft launches that exceed the actual 
reimbursement made to the federal government by the LANDSAT 
commercial v~ntllre 
• Continuing government-fundeu research and development related to 
LANDSAT (assumed to be $10 millio;') per year) 
• Direct equity contributions from the U.S. government to the LANDSAT 
venture 
• Any direct subsidy (also referred to as "additional federal purchases") 
Cash inflows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Payments for leases of government facilities 
Any nongovernment data sales and ground station fees 
"Asset recoupment" means any lnitie. payment made by the new 
venture when it taKes over the existing LAND5A T assets 
Any royalty fee'i that may be paid by the ventur.e to the governm..,nt 
• Tax revenues paid by the LANDSAT v(!nture if it eventually becomp.s 
profitable and exhausts its tax loss carry forward credits 
• Any dividends paid to the government if the government has becorne a 
s tockho lder. 
6.1.1 Government Owner~'ljp and Operation (Planned Phf.sse-Out) (Refer to 
Financial Exhilii t 6.1 J 
Under this scenario revenues and associated costs are reflectpd through 1988 
at which time LANDSAT D' ceases operation. No operating revenue is recognized 
beyond that time and all future costs of operating the land remote sensing system 
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are terminated. Federal purchases of remotely sensed data are assumed to be 
purchases from a third party at a cost consistent with amounts contained in the 
data set. As no private sector investment is reflected in thiS scenario, only 
government cash flows are projected. 
Costs and revenues generated through termination are consistent with 
amounts reflected in the data set with the exception of ground station fees and 
government R&D expenditures. These amounts have been reduced as the ~rogram 
approaches thl'! projected termination date. 
6.1.2 Government Ownershi and Operation (Continued Ownership and Oper~: 
!!2!!... Refer to Financial Exhibit 6.2) 
This projection reflects a continued operation of the land remote sensing 
system by the U.S. government. Revenues and costs are consistent with those 
reflected in the data set. Assets, as well as other costs, have been treated on a 
cash basis. A $10 million/year R&D expenditure has been included as an assumed 
commitment by the government over the ten year perie>d being projected. 
Revenues by the government reflect nongovernment data sales and ground 
station fees consistent with amounts dssumed in the data set. Interagency transfer 
payments for data 'Sold are not included in government receipts. 
,As this financial projection does not assume private sector operation!;, the 
Projected Statement of Income, Balance Sheets, Statement of Changes in Financial 
Position and private sector Projected Cash Flows, have not been included. 
6.1.3 Private Ownership and Operation (Refer to Financial Exhibits 6.3.1 
through 6.3.5) 
This financial projection assumes a divestiture of the land remote sensing 
system to a private sector enterprise. It is assumed that LANDSAT D and D' are 
purchased from the government by a private enterprise and that existing ground 
facilities are leased from the government for a four year period. AU costs of 
operations are borne by the private entity. It is also assumed that costs of 
archiving are borne by the private sector. As the entity cannot derive a satis-
factory rate of return on equity without federal assistance, "additiolial federal 
purchases" have been projected to derive a 17 percent return on equity to the 
private investor. 
The financial statements are derived from base revenues and cost assllrnp-
tions contained in the data set. Tax benefits and costs dre reflected on a current 
year basis. Although the space segment assets qualify as fiv~ year ACRS property 
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for depreciation for tax purposes, asset Uves of four years were used 
financial projections. Such timing differences have not been reflected 
benefit calculations and are not considered tei have a material effect. 
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Variables are reflected in the long-term debt and cumulative dividends 
amounts contained in the Projected Balance Sheets" Excess cash "thrown off" by 
th~ '/entlJre, in excess of 3StUrned long-t~rn' d~bt of $100 mUllen, llire t.r.,ated as 
rjbtribution of ol' .. i':.lends. 
The Projected Cash Flow provides for a discounted rate of return of approx-
imately 12 percent with a return on equity of 17 percent. RetlJrn on a3s~t5 an.:1 
debt to capitalization ratlos clre also provided. 
6.1.4 Phased Private Ownership (Private Sec.tor Marketing! (Refer to Finan-
cial Exhibits 6.4.1 through 6.4.3) 
The financial projections for phased private owner3hip reflect a separate 
marketing organization established with exclusive rights for sales of U.S.-produced 
land remote sensed data produced by the LANDSAT venture. Initially (first ten 
years) all costs of operation would be borne by the U.S. F,overnment. In return for 
such right!.l, the !.lrivate sector would pay c:. minimum royalty fee of 80 perc' n1; of 
ail data '301d 3I\C ground station fees with a minimum annual royalty payment 
(guaranteed) of $33.5 million. Cash generated by the venture in excess of 
operating requirements are first used to reduce long-term debt and next used to 
prov1de dividends to the private investor. A rate of return based upon present 
value of cash flows tor the first ten years is calculated.at 12 percent to 13 percent. 
Other ratios such as return on assets, return on equity and debt to capitalization 
are caicul.'lted based upon the present value of cash flow assumption of 12 percent 
to 1 J percent over the fi:-st ten years. Government cash flows reflect the costs of 
..:ontinued ol'eriltion C'p.duced by rcp.1ty fees c:olli!cted and tax I'evenu'!s rec:eived 
{l'om the private sector enterprise. 
6.1.' Le isJativel -Chartered Privatel -Owned Cor oratlon (Refer to Finan-
cial Exhibits 6 • .5.1 through 6.' • .5 --
The financial projection for this organizational scenario closely reflects 
private ownership (Section 6.1.3) with the addition of an equity participation by the 
U.S. government. The government would provide initial equity capital which was 
assumed to be a 33 percent participation. Dividend distributions from ·the 
enterprise provided in later years would be paid to the government based upon its 
equity participation. No provision has been made in the projection for the 
government liquidating its equity position in the venture at any time. 
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6.1.6 Comparison of Financial Projections 
In comparing projected operating r~su1ts of the five financial and organiza-
tional scenarios, it is appropriate to evaluate such alternatives from both a pubUc 
and private sector vkwpoint. It appears that the existing civlJ remote sensing 
system is not a viabhl commercial enterprise without either a signl1icant guaran-
teed subsidy by the U.S. government or a material reduction in the projected casts 
of operation. Government r.:osts for the continuation of the existing land remote 
sensing system range from an average annual cost of $68 mUlion (constant FY83$) 
per year for government operation to $82 mUUon (constant FY83$) per year under a 
private ownership alternative (Figure 6.3). If the private ~ector alternative is 
chosen, a minor reduction in cost to government may be achieved through transfer 
of existing LANDSAT program assets to the private sector without recollpmt,nt by 
the government (Figure 6.4). Assuming continuation of the system is desired, 
continued government operation reflects the iowest projected cost. The primary 
reason for continued government operation be the most cost effective alternative 
is that return on capital cost~ are not considered in the evaluation of government 
costs of operation. To attract private sector investment in an enterprise, a 
reasonable rate of return must be achieved. In order for a private sector 
alternative to provide a lower cost to the government (subsidy), cost and/or 
revenue efficiencies by the private sector would have to improve significantly to 
offset required return on capital. 
The financial analysis in this report is predicated upon a consistent set of 
data with regard to revenues and costs for both private sector operation as weU as 
continued operation by the government. A specific level of service was assumed. 
It should be noted that system configurations which provided other levels of service 
were not analyzed. It is possible that such systems may provide a lower cost to the 
government but would result in reduced services and benefits. 
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7. NONFINANCIAL ISSUES 
A • .,eral overview iI presented in the followin. parA.rAphs of the numerous 
nonf1nanc1&J !Slues related to the establ1lhment of an operatlonaJ land remote 
senlinl system. The .. illues are not new havinl been d1lcul'fId for at least the 
lut haif-decade. Many of the iSlues still beina d1scuued were identified at the 
.tart of the fR TS/LANDSAT prolram over a decade alo, others that have been 
identified in recent years as more det. l.&ed propo .. l. for a permanent operational 
framework have been put forward [2,6, 1,12,13,19,37 .. 46]. 
Thla section beainl with an analy.iI of the philosophical and practIcal 
dimen.ionl C)f the land remote sen.ina debatel it addre .... the que.tion "why has it 
be., 10 difficult to develop a permanent framework for us!", this technoloIY?" 
Issuel are then d1lcuaed in term. of four broad cateloriell international and 
foreign policy, national security, leaaJ/relulatory And institution.l. FlnaUy. there 
is a leneral summary of the pollcy requirements which must be met for .uccess in 
creatlnl an effective permanent framework for U.S. land remote sensinl activities. 
7.1 Commercialization of Land Remote Sensing: A Persiltef'lt Political Question 
The experimental U.S. remote sensing prOlram has been underw~y since the 
late 1960s, with the first satellite put in orbit over a decade alol over $1.' bUllon 
has be., invested in the prolram to date. Over the past flve years, there has been 
an extended and complex debate over how best to brinl land remote sensing int~ 
operational status. Sunestions have inc luded I creating arl internationai con .. 
• IOrtium modeled on Inte1sat to own and operate the system; reconfiluring NASA 
** as system operator; creating a new private corporation for earth observa .. 
... 
tions; and, after extef'.ive revi~w durinl the Carter Administration, assilning 
the management role to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric AdmL,lstra .. 
tion (NOAA) pending "event1~!'1 transfer to private sector ownership and opera .. 
tion •• *.. Now, the current Administration has decided to terminate a direct 
• 
•• 
••• 
•• *. 
Thla sunestion is contained in National Academy of Sciences, 22. £!! • 
This suggestion is contained in Augenstein, Shapley and Skolnikoff, 22· S.!!., 
and a biU introduced in 1979 by Senator Adlai Stevenson (0-111.>, S. 6~3, 96th 
Congress, 1 st Session • 
This suggestion is contained in a bill introduced in 1979 by Senator Harrison 
Sch,'1\itt (R .. N.M.), S. 87', 96th Congress, 1st Session • 
The Carter decision was announced in November 1979; it was contained In 
Presidential Directive '4. 
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government role in operating the system as soon as possible, with land observation 
sateUltes to be taken over by the private sector, either in cumbination with 
it 
weather sate lUtes or by themselves. In stark contrast, in their respons~s to a 
Department of Commerce Request for Information 1n the tall of 1982, three major 
aerospace firms which have been intimately involved in earth observation programs 
suggested that the whole discussion of an operational s)'stem is premat~t';, and th:!.t 
any move to commercializlI.: land remote sensing at this time woulG undermine the 
long-term viabUlty u1 the enterprisel 
The point "'~re is not to analyze these specific proposals in any dete.lJ, out 
rather to suggest why th"re have been so rnany widely different answers to a single 
question: "How to assure that U.S. society gets the maximum benefits from its 
investment in remote sensing research and development to date?" If it reveals 
nothing else, the history of the discussion so far tells us that there is no one "right" 
answer to that question. 
Why is this so7 There are both practical and phi1osophic~1 reasons. They 
include: 
it 
• The lANDSAT demonstration program has not been a success, if 
succe~ is defi!ied a5 developing the information and experience re-
quired to make informed decisions with respect to the de~irabillty of 
public vs. private ownership and the form of private ownership 
• 
• 
There is a mismatch \)etween the capabUlties provided by land observa-
tion technology and the structure of both public and private sector 
organizations which might benefit frorn those capabUlties 
land remote ~ensing can provide a wide variety of benefits ranging 
from intangible public goods to high doUar value private returns; there 
are strong differences in political philosophy and values over which of 
these benefits shouJd be given priority in designing a permanent 
fra mewol'~: for operating the technology 
• In a related wa)', there are persister.: .': d'~ ~rences in perspective about 
the respecti'/e roles of governmen't 81:'1 the private !Jet:tor in prov~ding 
various services to societ)' and about how best to insure return to the 
public from its investments in government research and development 
programs 
• Finally, land remote sensing has inherently global dimenSions, it. only 
because it operates using resources which are recognized a~ global 
"commons"-outer space and the frequency spectrum. While it may be 
possible to design a framework for the technology on a national basis, 
there are inescapable international dimensions to the problem. 
Remote sensing poHcy under the Reagan Administration is reviewed in M. 
Mitchell Waldrop, "What Price Privatizing LANDSAT?" 3ciencC!, February 11, 
198.3, pp. 7'2-7'4. 
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It is beyond the scope of this report to discuss al'y of these g"neral concerns 
in depth, yet they provide the context within which the specific issues are 
discussed below. The recent discussions of commerci~1ization, in particular, have 
been carried out against the backdrop of an expectation created early in the 
LANDSA T program that land remote sensing would create billions of dollars 
* annually in benefits. If indeed the technology, as soon as it was relatively mature, 
could have such an impact, and if the benefits could be provided as priv.l.te gouds, 
then clearly rapid commerciaHzation was a pl~usible objective and pNential 
operators should be struggling to be first in,Hr.e to have an opportunity to profit 
from remote sensing. 
That is clearly not the case. The market assessment presented in Section 4 
indicat~5 the limited size of the current market for LANDSAT products and 
suggests only moderate mid-term prospects for growth in proQucts for which 
specific users would be willing to pay a significant price. There may well be 
extremely high benefits !2. society from employing land remote sensing technoiogy, 
but it seems extremely difficult to provide those benefit.s in terms of privatp. 
goods. The bl'eakdown of potential benefit, given in Table 7.1 may be useful in 
understanding the mixed publlc good/private good results of the use of this 
capability; that understanding is in turn a key to recognizing why it has been so 
difficult to reach agreement on most of the issues under debate. 
In the end it is the political questions-the division of rol.,s an\. o'espol1s i,-
biHties between the pubJic and private sector-which i:5 driving, and complicating, 
all of the discussions surrounding the permanent fl'amework for land remete 
sensing. In many ways the current situation may be considered unIque in that it 
involves a tt:chnology developed and demor.str~ted totally under public sector 
auspices and for which the federal government remains a major user, yet which has 
still been expected throu3ho.ut its development to be eventually transferred to the 
private secto:'. Current patterns of operation, with users both inside and outside 
the government, run the risk of being disrupted by a possible transfer of the 
*Por example, in 197; the value over a two-year period of information on 
wheat crops was estimated at $400 million to the United States and $1.7 bil-
lion to the rest of the world; benefits of a 198; operational system (fer 
information on wheat only) were estimated at $300 million/year for the 
United States and $1.5 billion/year for the rest of the world. American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Space: A Resource for Earth (New 
York, 1977), p. 28. 
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~----------------------------------------,------'--------------~ TABLE 7.1 U.S. INTERESTS IN CIVIL REMOTE SENSING 
TEC~NICAL WTERESTS 
A. BASIC ~CmmFIC KNCilLEDGE ANt) UND£R'iTAtlDI~(I OF VARIOUS fE'\Tl!KES OF THE E.''''TIt 
C. fiLOBAL ~A?ACIih.) FOR OE,~LING IHTH UAT:ONAL ANO :~TERNI\TlOII,lL ,>nOB:',MS I~I AGRt· 
':lILTURE, E~ERr,V. ETi.. 
C. TECHNOLOGY DEVF.LOPMF.NT PROVIDING ADVAr~CEMENTS IN REfi(lTF. WISIlIG AND RELATED 
FIELDS 
~-- ------------------------------,------------------~ PUBLIC INTERESTS 
A. SPFClFIC feDERAL NEEDS AND FUNCTIONS WITHIN VARIOUS AGENCIES AND PROGRAt~MAnC 
P' .S 
B. PUBLIC INTEREST NEEDS AND BENEFITS FOR STA1ES, LOCALITIES, UNIVERSITIES AND 
GENERAL PUBLIC 
r.. SUPPORT FOR U.S. DECISION MAKWG BY PROVIDING INFORMATlOr. ON SUCH ITEMS AS 
CROP PRODUCTION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
ECOPIOMI C INTEREST 
A. ECOtluMIC INTERESTS OF U.S. PRIVA':'E SECTOR tN A VARIETV OF FIELDS, I.E., OIL AND 
MlNEi<AL E~PL\)RP,TlON 
~. U.S. CO~ll'IETiTIVE POSlilCtI IN SPACE TECHNOL03Y INCLUDING MANUFACTUI\lfIG AND SERVIC· 
!NG OF EQUIPMF.~r. DISSF.MtNATION OF DATA, PROviSION OF TECHNICAL SERVICES AND 
ANAL.VSIS 
C. ~EDUCTION IN INFORMAllON COSTS fuR FEDERAL, STATE, LOC~L ~ND PRIVATE SOURCES 
D. CONTR I BunON TO GENERAL ECONOMI C GROWTH BOTH OF LOCs AND THE 'I/ORLD AS A WHOLE 
E. RETURN o:~ SPACE INVESTMENT WI: ,1 ECONomc AND OTHER KINOS OF BENEFITS FOR NOMINAL 
COST 
U.S. INTERNATIONAL WTERESTS 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
SUPPORT FOREI~N POLIC~ THROUGH PROVISION OF INFORMATION AND RELATED SERVICES 
MAINTAIN U.S. LEADERSHIP WInI THIS TECHNOLOGY AS ILLUSTRATION OF CONTINUED LEADER. 
SHIP IN SPACE 
SuPPORT lI.5. POSITION WITH Lues HONOP.ltIG COMMITMENTS FOR TECMNOLCIGY ANO BUTTRESSING 
POSI':'ION IN NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUES, THE U.N. ~ND OTHER F~RU~S 
suppor(j tN':'ERNATlONAI. (;OOI'ERATION tN ~P~CE VIA COII,MHM!::Nrs TO FOREIGN GROur.c STATIONS 
ANJ OTHER INVE.STORS FOR DATA c:mmNUIiY AND EVE~TUAL SYSTEr1S COMPATIBILITY 
PROMOTE OPENNESS THROIlGH THE TREAmENT 0': GENfP.AL IN::rIRMATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL 
GuuD 
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AS MODEL OF EFFECTIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS AMONG 
NATIONS 
SOURCE: EARTH ItIFORMATION FROM SPACE BY REMOTE SENSWG, A REPORT PREPARED FOR OSTP BY 
ImiNOAUG£NSTElN, ""erIS SHAPLEY AND EUGErf£6. SKOLNIKOFF. JlINE 2, 1978, PP. 4·7. 
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system. Thus both poUtical interests and nrganizational inertia are involved in this 
transfer, makins the decision even more dU1icult. 
Successful commerciaJizl.tion depends on whether there are sufficil!'nt private 
benefits to lead to an eventual sat!.sfactory return on investment for a private 
operator, recognizing the existence of a continuing and su~stantial government 
demand for land remote sensing services. As one of its findings, the Subcommittee 
on Space and AppJications, of the HOIJse Committee on Science and Technology, 
concluded that 
The greatest negative influence on the evoltJtiol1 of an operational cIvU 
and land remote sensing system has been the inability to fully evaluate 
the relationship between LANDSAT and national needs to 'provide a 
long-range policy that is continuously reflected in the budget. 
AU in all, given the economic factors discussed elsewhere in this r>!port, the 
past history of the LANDSAT program and the current nonfinancial issues <1JsclJssed 
in this section, the task of dt!signing an appropriate long.ttwm framework for the 
land remote sensing system is about as chaUenging ~ t.:Ine could ever flnd. As 
mentioned earlier, it is obviolJs that the issues raised reflect fundamental dlf .. 
ference~, in politic/,i! philosophy which exist in the U.S. society; the. dominant 
philo~ophy at a particular time determines priorities and defines the appropriate 
role of government. All of these diff'!rences are the topic of continuing poUtlcal 
debate! and are unresolvable analyticaUy. Inevitably, au eventual decision on a 
permanent framework for the land remCite ~(.!nsing is going to be a political decision 
in which one set of value5 prevails over another. This report can make a 
contribution to informing tho~ participating in such debate, but it cannot 
substitute for the political process. 
7.2 International and Foreign Pollcy Is.!!:!!! 
The capability to make useful observa tions of all parts of the earth's land 
surface from orbit, using a U.S.-developed and operated sateUite system, has 
provided a foreign policy opportunity for the United States. It has also created 
international demands that the UnIted States, along with other potential operators 
of earth observation systems, be governed by a series of existing and emerging 
international obligations and principles related to remote sensing. These op-
portunities and obligations d~fine ar.. essential part of the context within which 
• *House Committee on St;ience and Technology, Civil Land Remote Sensing,~. 
fit., p. 4. 
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varioul scenarios related to a permanent U.S. remote sensit\g venture must be 
evaluated. 
Current U.S. government policy with respee. t to the international aspects ot 
remote sensing dates back to Richard Nixon's 1969 pledge before the U.N. General 
Assembly that "this program wiU be dedicated to producing information not only 
for the U.S. but abo for the world community." in the years since, the United 
States has put fcrth, and defended strongly Against critic1srn, a policy of open ~nd 
nondiscriminatory access on the 'part of all countries and the'..- citiz:ens to the 
products of the LANDSAT system. The United States has taken positive ~teps, 
ranging from aUowing other countries direct access to LANDSAT spacecraft with 
their own ground stations to providing t~chnical assistance to countries wishing to 
use LANDSAT information, to Implement Nixon's 1969 statement and it! open 
acces:. policy. Any attempts to reverse the policy, to change the expectations or 
to modify the patterns 01 use which have evolved over the past decade wUl be 
certain to create international tenslon. 
The current state of international thinking on remot.e sensing, at least on the 
governmental level, is per~aps best reflected in the report of the 1 ~82 Unispace 
Conference. That report noted that although remote sensing is st111 in c\ 
"preoperational" stage, "it 15 only a matter of time-and a short time-before this 
very lmportant application attains a completely operational status." Given this 
reaHty, tne report said "agreement should be reached on principles governing 
sateUlte remote sensing. Work to thJs efff!ct .... should be continued as a matter of 
priority, aimed at speedy agreement on such prinCiples." In addition to a 
framework of general principles, concern was expressed that 
SateJUte operators should give assurance about contin'Jity of data flows 
and provide indications about estimated lifetin,e [of] preoperational 
and operational systems in order tu help all r:uuntires, in particular the 
developing countries. CompatabiUty of various systems al't; data 
formats is another important aspect .... 
Since remote sensing can collect data from all countries, it is therefore 
possibJ~ to use shared or internationally-owned rernote sensing satel-
Utes .... 
It is suggested tha t a study be undertaken to asses, the need for and the 
viabl11ty of a worldwide remote sensing system. Such a study could 
considel' various ways of providjng remote sensing data-including 
regional, bilateral, multilateral and international arrangements-with 
the users bearing therefore the development, production, launching and 
operation costs of the satellites. Assuming that anyone of these 
systems could provlde assurance of continuity of data formats, avoid 
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forced obsoleGCence of equipment, and enable the development and use 
of stand.ardlzed data analysis software, the study should in particular 
indicate the comparadve cost of such systems to the users vis-a-vis 
systems currently in operation and/or under development. 
A persistent issue in internatior.al dlscuulons is "a possible situation in which 
data are not available to the senHd State but are avallable for commercial Ili,d 
othe-r forms of exploitation by another country." At the conference 
Some delegat\ons expressed serious conce,'n rogardlng the disseminadon 
of data collected by remote sensing sate lUtes., While several developed 
and developing countries felt that such informatlon should be freely 
avaUable to any interested State, most delegatIons felt that the consent 
of the sensed State should be required before dsta could be reJeased to 
a third State organization or third party. Some developing nations feit 
that the consent of the sensed State must be obtaineu before ser.sing, 
even if the information was not to be disseminated beyond the 
concerned Statesl some felt that in no case should the lnformation be 
available to any State other than the sensor and sensed States. Most 
representatives expressing an opinion on the point vreed that priority 
1n access to data must be accorded the sensed State. 
** The central points made by potential foreign users of land remote 5en~ing 
products, then, are: 
• The need for continuity In aperation and overall system characteristics 
• The need for guaranteed access at an acceptable price with provisions 
to avoid intrusions on national sovereignty. 
The United States has attempted to deal with these pressures from, the 
international community in ways that maximize these U.S. poli,=}, objectlves: 
** 
• Maintaining U.S. leadership in space technolcgy 
• Assisting the economic and social development of the developing 
countries 
• Promoting international cooperation as a means of achieving common 
objectives and as an example of the benefits of harmonious relation-
ships among natIons 
• Ensuring U.S. abUlty to use space technology for its own national 
objectives, including operatIon of earth observatinn syst~ms by both 
civil and national security agencie$ 
The current debate is between the United States, as the country, farthest 
along in developing a remote senslng system, and countries witho>ut plans to 
develop their own systems. In general, other potential system operatorl.i, such 
as France and Japan, have moved to a position close to that of the United 
States on such issues as the need for prior consent of a sensed state. 
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Enhancing the development of the U.S. economy by fostering new 
industries, new employment opportunities and new marketl for U.S. 
firm!. 
In seeking to achieve the .. objectivel the U.S. govern,,,ent hal ('ntered 1nto a 
seriel of legal and poUtical obligatlonl. The .. include. 
• The provison, of the ()uter Space Treaty of 1967 which require "States 
party to the Troaty" tn ''bear international responlibUlty for nalional 
activities In outer space, ••• whttthftr such activitles are carrIed on by 
govdrnrraental a,enciel or by nongovernmental endUes,'1 .uch non-
governmental activitiel "require authorization an~ continuing super-
vision by the appropr'iate State party to the Treiity." 
• A series of agreements negotiated with other 80vernm~nts to permit 
them acce~s under mutually asreeabie terms to the u"tput of U.S. 
remote sensing sateUites usinS foreign owned and operated groulld 
station,. 
• Through our advocacy of the pollcy of open, nondlscri:ninatory access In 
UN forums and otherwise, ' fairly explicit obUgation not to create 
either formal or informal (such as unaffordable prices or continuing 
change!! in technical format of the system output) barriers to any 
country, organization or individual who wants to use the system, with 
ali u~ers receiving nondiscriminatory treatment. 
• Thf'ough negntiations in the International Telecornmunlcations Union, 
agreement not to use the frequencies allocated for commurdcat1.1! 
remote sensing data strl!ams to ground stations for any other purpose. 
Cilven this mf!lange of concerns, objec'tlves and obligations, a few of the 
international issljes which are suggestl!d include: ** 
Future International Negotiations 
Over coming years as remote sensing capabUl '-ies evolve, there are sure to be 
continuing international negotiations. These will take place in the United Nations, 
other permanent multilateral organlzations, ad hoc or informal multilateral groups, 
or on a bUatera1 basill. Plrtlcipation in these negotiations ma) vary, dependl.'8 on 
the framework adopted for U.S. remote sensing activities. t1 a private ~ector 
option is selected, what interrlational role, if any, will the private sector operator 
want the U.S. government to play? What role will U.S. government agencies 
believe is required to protect U.S publlc interests? 
* Treaty on Principles Covering the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967, 
Article VI. . 
**This discussion treats only the distinction between a government-owned 
system and a privately-owned system without attention to various scenarios 
for private ownership. Such treatment is provided in the comparative 
analysis in Table 8.2 
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Evolution of International Principles to Covern Relnote Sensing 
After ten years of debate in the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS), there remain major differences. Prospects for consensual 
agreement (which is the standard practice for this committee) are dim. In a 
similar situation with respect to direct broadcast satemtes, a majority of countries 
.. reed to mO'ie the issue from COPUOS to the Pol1tical C " ,1mittee of the General 
Alsembly, which operates according to majority vote. The United States opposed 
this move, and the principles which resulted from it. Might the pt"s~ect of 
transfer to private sector operation stimulate a simUar attempt? 
Maintenance of Open Nondiscriminatory Access 
The interest~ of a commercial operator might sometimes confUct with the 
long-standing U.S. policy in this area, one way of increasing the value of remote 
sensing products is to llmit their dissemination. Another is by providing priority 
access to some users. The Department of Commerce Land Remote SenSing 
Satemte Advisory Committee recommended that there be a government require-
ment "that the operator, whether it be the government and/or the private sector, 
subscribe to the open sky pollcy-which prirnarily means that anyone, anywhere. in 
any countries can purchase the data at equitable prices." - The current government 
policy, as enunciated in President Reagan's space polley statement of July 4, 1 ~82, 
is to "support the publlc, nondiscriminatory direct readout of data from federal 
civil sy:stems to foreign ground stations and the prOVision of data to foreign users 
--
under specIfied conditons." The polley is sHent on requirements for non federal 
systems. 
One way to restrict access to remot~ sensing data is to adopt policies which 
are expllcitly discriminatory. Ar,other means is to price certain data (such as 
"quick looks") in ways that exclude some potentially interested users. ThiS 
possibility has been noted by the International community, for example, a 
Romanian spokesman told COPUOS this spring of his concern about "the relatively 
new question of considering satelBte remote sensing activities as operational, on a 
purely commerclaJ basis, with the immediate conseqlJence of augmenting by 
-
Department of Commerce, Minutes of the Land Remote Sensing Satemt~ 
Advisory Committee meeting, November 1982. 
--The public statement of Administration space policy is contained in a White 
House Fact Sheet, "National Space Policy,'; July 4, 1982. 
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several times th. cost of remote sensing products. Under these conditions, 
effective access to the data is practicaHy possible only for developed countries." 
How wlU considerations of COlt recovery and even co,...\.,,~rcial profit interact 
with an open accelS policy as an operational system evolves? WlU system products 
be provided to poorer countries on a subsidized basis? What are the interactions 
"mong U.S. polley objfCtlve:s vill-a'!is deveiopil'S countries, th~ economic viabUlty 
I)t lin operational syst~1TI Ind the aeneral concern of avoiding ton.lon81 Although 
poorer countries may In the Ions term have ttae prospect of receiving the most 
oon,,11t5 from remote sensing, who wUI mike the investments required tor thom to 
be effective users, and thus a growins market for the syuem? In the short run, 
would more expensive products from a private commercial system drive away non-
U.S. users1 
Meaning of U.S. Leadership in Space Technology 
Current policy is to "maintain United States space ieadel'~h'p," particularly in 
"critical aspects of space, appUcatJons and technology," in these areas, the 
* ol,j.!t:tlves is "r»reemlraence." The meaning of this poUcy with respect to remote 
s:nsing technology Is unclear. Ciiven the emerging foreign competition in the field, 
how wlU the U.S. government respond: by a continued program of R&D in the 
remote sensing area, keyed to 5taying ahead of competing systems; by reliance on 
the private sector to develop a superior system for the United Statest without 
continuing government R&D subsidies; by providing l5ubsidi~s or incentives beyond 
R&D to a commercial operator in order to help it best foreign competition and thu. 
bring the benefits of a growing remoto sensing industry (sales of equipment: 
training of non-U.S. personnel; consulting ~ervices, etc.) TO the U.S. economy? Or 
is cI',11 remotf' ~ensing not" "critical" area, and thus ""t on". which requires U.S. 
ieadership? Wh:.n wouJd be the! COst..s. ira term3 of mo .. ~\. ,J foreign policy or 
econom'c objectives, of a no.,-U.S. 5yst~1TJ dOl11lnQ·~ .. jg the world market for 
remote senSing? l'hls co.'Jld happen if no commercial ~j"stem is establlshed and the 
U.S. government withdraws from remote r. 
reaches the end of its lifetime, or if the U.S. C'J 
---; 
4Sct~vitv after I.ANCSAT 0' 
:;l,d vent,Jre is unsuccessful. 
The public statement of Administration spacl! pollcy is contained in a White 
House FiSct Sheet, "National Space Pollet," July .J, 1982. 
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Future of Non-U.S. Ground Stations 
It 15 likely that any future U.S. remote sensing system wUl use a data relay 
satellite to return data to U.S. ground station. Thu3 there will be no strong 
requirement, from a U.S. perspective, for direct readouts to ground stations 
outside the United States. For a number of yean, the U.S. Jlovernment has 
permitted, even encouraged, the development of such ground stations, mainly as 
means of underUning U.S. pollcy on open acc'.:ss and as a symbol of friendly 
relationships. Other governments have entered into agreements with the United 
States government with respect to access to LANDSAT and have ma<1e substantial 
investments in ground stations and related data proces:ling and interpretation 
equipment. The motivations of these countries have ranged from national prestige 
to Ii careful calculation of tangible payoffs frorTI the use of LANDSAT data. 
The role of foreign ground stations in an era of operational remote sensing 
systems is problematical. If cost recovery is the objective of a gov~rnment 
system, will the access fee and royalty arrangements have to increase to levels 
which foreign operators will find hard to accept? WiH the U.S. go\'ernment provide 
what is in effect subsidized acces! to foreign operators'? If a private U.S. system 
evolves, what changes will result in the relationship with non-U.S. entities, which 
negotiated their current arrangements with the U.S. government? Would some 
countries prefer to deal with a non-U.S. system rather than a U.S. system which is 
privately operated? Could non-U.S. gr'ound stations be effective in the role of 
regional franchised distributors of remote sensing products, operating in a com-
merical context? Iiow could any proprietary restrictions em remote sensing data, 
e.g., copyright, be policed and enforced when t~ere is multiple access to the 
system? 
Creating Dependency Relations 
To date few entities (including those in the Urjited States) are critically 
dependent on the availability of remote ~ensing data to achieve their important 
objectives. As the technology matures and its use becomes widespread, this 
situation could change. This has positive aspects from a U.S. perspective, since it 
would place the country in a position to exert som~ influence orl global develop-
ments because it controlled a technological resource with global implications. 
There are rlegative aspects as well; for example, countries which depend on reliable 
access to U.S.-supplied remMe sensing data rraay protest or retaliate if, for some 
" 1\ 
'I 
'I 
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price!s, or provide products with degraded quality. By making remote sensing a 
critical tooi in the common task of managln~ the global ecosystem, the United 
States takes the responsibility of long-term, hlgh-quaJity performance of its earth 
observation systems. 
This discussion of the international aspects of land remote sensing has been 
extensive because the international charactC!r of the system presents ~xtremely 
dllfjc'JIt isuues to those attempting to iJelect a frarnework for' the U.S. oper:\tiolli:&l 
Gystem. This is especially the case when the general foreign pollcy issues discussed 
In this sectIon are examined together with those Issues more closely related to 
national security concerns. The next section is such an examination. 
7.3 National Security Issues 
It is a matter of public record that the United States uses earth observation 
satellites as one of its means of gathering inteHigence information with respect to 
other areas ... f the world; these satellites are assets of extremely high value to U.S 
national security interests. The capabilities of these sate11ltes have also be~n 
exten5jvely discussed; and in most parameters they clearly exceed those available 
lor <":1:/ ilian use. However, it is also reasonable to suggest that some information 
with intelligence significance can be extracted from existing clvilian land obser'va-
tion satellites and that existing national security systems may not duplicate aU 
capabilities available in civilian sateHites (tor example, coverage in particular 
spectral bands>. 1"us there are unavoidable national security aspect:; to the routine 
operation at a civilian land remote sensing system. Ii' times of international 
tensions or crises, these aspects become more pronounced, and the U.S. govern-
ment will want to ensure that its national :;ecuri'Cy agencies will be able to contro! 
all earth observation systems in that situation. 
Just as earth observation systems have both civilian and natIonal security 
appllcations, the technologies on which they are !lased have "dual use" characteri~­
tics. Capabilities developed initially for national security purposes have potential 
relevance to civilian uses, and the technologies involved in sensors, data pro-
cessing, image interpretation, etc. are sensitive in terms of export control 
regulC'. dons. 
* For a discussion of the capabilities of various U.S. observation satellites, see 
Thomas H. Karas, The New High Ground, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983, 
Ch.4. 
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Given these realities, the following national security issues are sllggested. 
"0 en Skies" Precedent and AbUit 
l.2D! 
One not quite incidental faUout from the U.S. polley of open, nondis-
criminatory access to the products of governmf!nt earth observation systems 
operated for civUlan purposes is the creation of a cUmatc in which aU U.S. 
observation sateHites can function without drawing protests from the countries of 
the world. Any modification of an open access policy, particularly by a private 
opel'ator seeking competitive advantage or increased economic return, could 
change this situation. For example, in the wake cf the recent Administration 
announcemer~t of its intent to transfer ownership and operation of civiJian earth 
observation ~teUites to the private sector, one Canadian official indicated that his 
government was "very concerned," saying "we have a sateUite looking down at our 
country and we don't call it a spy sateJUte becau5e we hAve nondiscriminatory 
access to it .... But if we were charged 100 times as much by some company, then 
we might have to begin to wonder about this."· 
Tradeoff! Between National Security Interest and Economic Competiveness 
Concerns 
Under continued government ownership and operation of the land remote 
sensing satellite system, past patterns of coordination between national security 
agencies and civilian agencies such as NASA and NOAA would likely persist. Some 
civiUan sector objectives differ from those of the intelligence community, which 
has taken a conservative position on making available advanced sensor capabilities. 
On the whole, however, the relationship between the two sectors of the govern-
ment has worked weH. The potential for the transfer of the system out of 
government control d,,'es create serious questions regarding the extent of govern-
ment supervision necessa,'y and possible. National securlty-r~lated areas in which 
a possible regulatory regime might engage itself inchlde: spectral resolution, 
center frequency and tunable range; spatial resolution; geographic coverage; 
timeliness of data availability; tasking p"ocedures and controls; and data dis-
semination policies. 
The kind of quiet coordination which 15 possible within the government would 
be much more difficult to maintain in a relationship with a private sector entity. 
• • Washmgton Post, March 8, 1983, p. 1 • 
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In the instance of private sector operation of the system, it becomes very 
Important to recognize the need tu temper nation,,1 security consideratIons when 
designing an appropriate regulatory regime. Out. regard must be given to the 
international market in which the private entity Is operating, so that regulatory 
practices do not seriously erode the system's competitive position. A private 
operator may find, for example, that improved sensor characteristics may be 
required in order t~ k~p itself economicatly su!vel,t. 
From the national security point of vIew, those sensor characteristics may 
present problems "ither in terms of revealing sensitive U.S. technological capabUi-
ties or in terms of providing images of the Unit<!d States or other countries from 
which inteUigence information could be extracted. If sensor capabilities were to 
be improved, then the intelligence community might want to involve itself in the 
process of determining appropriateness of data for dissemination. 
Reaching a balance between considerations of national security on one hand, 
and the need to develop a high performance, economlcaUy competitive systern_ on 
the other, will continue to be a very difficult and complicated lssue as land remote 
sensillg s:t.te11ite teci'mology develops. Further aggrevating this ba.lance is the fact 
that U.S. national security interests and controls are in a large part derived from a 
different set of motivations and values than the potential security controls which 
might be applied to the French, European or Japanese systems. Thus there ls 
unlikely to be easy agreement among operators of remote sensing systems over 
what are acceptable limits on system performance from a national security 
perspective. 
Export Control RegulationI' and l..and Remote Sensing 
There is heightened concern in recent years tnat U.S.-developed technology is 
being acquired 'ly our adversaries and used as a major b3sis for their military 
•• capabilities. There is also recognition that the export .,f ilroducts and services 
based on advanced technology !s a major source of positive U.S. balance-of-trade. 
Creating an operational U.S. land observation system aimed at dominating the 
international :narket brings with it an export control issue: will the United States 
aggressively seek to supply all elements required for other countries to participate 
in such a system, e.g., ground stations, computing capability, image interpretation 
---;'Thls argument is made in, for example, Department of Defense, Soviet 
Military Power, 1983. 
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capabil1ty, or wlll concerns over the export of sensitive or dual-use technologies 
llmit the abUlty of the United States to capitallze fully on such a ml!&rketlng 
opportunity? 
National security concerns such I" those em .. led in the last two issues 
discussed above, in the context of a pr!,vatcly-op;.eratcd system, must be addressed 
':'Iithln the framework of whatever regulato,"y regime 1s created to oversee such a 
system. Such legal and regulatory issues are discussed in the following sectlon. 
- ,.. 
7.4 Regulatory and Legal Issues 
. , 
Most regulatory issues arise, almost by definition, in the case of private 
sector operation of a land remote sensing system. Since any private system 
a) carries with it the international and national security impUcations discussed 
above, b) will be based on publlcly-funded research and demanstration results, and 
c) wlU be serving a large variety of government needs, it is appropriate that the 
government take the measures required to protect the public interest with respect 
to private system operation. 
Convenely, a private system operator has the right to protection of its 
commercial interests; it should not be required to operate under conditions which 
prevent 01' inhibit success in developing a private sector remote sensing industry, 
and it may require various ferms of government protection or ass.istance to develop 
such an industry. 
Whatever kind of legal and regulatory framework i!' adopted at the initiation 
of a private sector land remote sensing venture, it must be flexible enough to 
evolve over time as the enterprise grows and adapts to a changing operational and 
competitive situation. There will also have to be a decision on how general/speci-
fic any regulatory framework should be. Most poten,tial private sector operators 
would probably prefer the most general kind of regulations which are pOlitically 
acceptable; give., the many facets of system operation which are candidates for 
regulation, however, publlc authorities may decide 'that a relatively specific set of 
regu.latory requirements will best ~;i,'utect the public ir-1:er'!st. 
One area of common cor"cern, whether the system is governmentally- or 
privately-operated, is that of proprietary controls over data a:'\d system products. 
If any kind of cost recovery is a system goal, then it appears tt.at some form of 
control, such as copyright, is required to prevent secondary duplication and 
dissemination of system products. 
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The issues discussed below, then, reflect a ~ecision to transfer land remote 
sensing re3ponsibUity to sorne term of pri"ate operator. 
Protection Against Competition? 
lhe key issue here is whether the land rernote senSing enterprise is a natural 
monopoly, and thus deserving of government protection from damaging competi-
tion, or whether over the next hw years various potential private suppUers of 
remote sensing services wiU emerge. In this latter case, the appropriate role for 
government Is to preserve a competitive environment and to prevent undesirable 
monopoly controi. The findings of this report suggest that, at least for each class 
of remote sensing products individually, only one commercial ventur~ can be 
successful, and thus that the situation does indeed resemble that of a natural 
monopoly. It is a sllghtly different question, however, whether that monopoly 
organization should be allowed to evolve through proving itself superior to any 
competitioli ov~r a period of time, or whether it should be established at the start 
through competition over the awarding of the remote sensing "franchise." 
Starting with the assumption that a private monopoly of remote senSing is 
abo In the public i1,tea"est, the question then becomes: "What public assurances are 
required to ensure that a private venture is economically viable, with a reasonable 
degree of risk?" This is as much a political as an analytici\l question, and thus must 
eventually be answered in the context of the policy de'lelopment and approval 
process. 
Possible Ar~as for Regulation 
In the discussions of this section, no distinction is made between the legal 
requirements which might be embodied in a contract between the government and 
a private sector operator and requirements which might be spelled out (~ither by 
Congress or by the designated regulatory entity basea on its general authority) in 
the form of actual reg'Jlations and regulatory policies. In practice, h~wever, this 
distinction will be important, as it i~ llkely to be easier to modify contract 
requirements on the basis of experience than to change formal regulatory require-
ments. 
Candidates for regulation include: pricing pollcies, conditions of service, 
conditions of access to system output, role of system operator in associated 
ventua·es, technical standards for various system products, requirements for coordi-
nation and complementarity with non-U.S. systems, adherence to international law 
an,d treaties, adherence to national security constraints, prOVisions for government 
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access or takeover in times of naUonal emergency, insider use of remote sernling 
information, export control constraints, etc. the list is long and the requirements 
complex and not alwaYIi co""i:. '.ent. The pubUc interests invoJved are significant, 
but the danger of overregulation IJndermining the viablUty of a private venture is 
real. Thus decisions on the nature and degree of regulation are likely to be 
difficult and subject to chal1enge. This is another reason for a flexible regulatory 
approach as the system evolves. 
Possible Areas for Covernment Assistance 
--------------------------------
Since currently the federal government acquires a large portion of the 
distributed information products, the fundamental assistance that the government 
can provide to a private operator is guaranteeing to meet government needs by 
purchasing remote sensing products from a single U.S. operator, rather than 
procuring them on a competitive basis from other U.S. or international providers. 
The time span ~f this guarantee and its specific provision wlU be a subject of 
negotiation as the private venture evolves. However, questions which will 
intwitably be raised includez 
• Can the U.S. government pledge to purchase a speCified amount of 
anything from a private suppUer well into the future, when the funds 
for such purchas~s have not been appropriated? Or must the pl~dge be 
to purchase aU of government's needs from a single suppHer, withfJut a 
guarantee of a minimum amount of business? 
• What wiU happen to government purchase requirements if the private 
operation is successful? Is un.successful? In ·the former case, wiU 
government incur a reduced purchase obllgation, or a reduction In 
price? WUJ there be any kind of profit-sharing? In the latter case, wiU 
there be "bail out" provisions which wiU increase the cost to govern-
ment of assisting the system? What are the government's obligations to 
a falling system? 
In addition to long-term purchases of system products, government can 
provide a number of other forms of legal and regulatory assistance to a private 
operator. These include: 
• 
• 
• 
Providing copyright or other form of proprietary protection so that the 
private operator can control dissemination of remote sensing products; 
this protection would have to extend to the operation of foreign ground 
stations and purchases by non-U.S. uses. 
Waiving Freedom of Information Act proviSions so that the government 
does not have to provide to the general public cop~es of products which 
the government purchases for its own needs. 
Agreeing on terms for government use of its purchases. Will several 
agencies be able to share a single product, or must each agency pay for 
its own needs? 
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ProvidinS protection from legal actionl initiated by potential competI-
tors. What wUl be the anti-trust contextln force 11 the government 
creates and maintains over time a monopoly relataonshlp with a single 
remute senlinS venture? 
Helping the private operator In market dovelopment vis-a-vis, on one 
hMd, such potential users al state and local governments and research 
institutions and, on the other, overseas markets which might result 
from U.S. 80vern~e.'t t",chnical assistance program~ or export pro-
motion ,,11orts. 
P.rotectlr'g the U.S. operator against unfair foreign competition in 
third-cowitry markets or in the nongovernment share of the U.S. 
market. 
As the above discullion suggests, questions arising from the necessary 
relationship between the U.S. government and any private system operator wUl be 
persistent and multifaceted. In order to, carry out the govei'nment role in this 
partnership, an effective institutional mechanism or m!!chansims must be char-
tered. The foUow.lng section discusses this and other institutional Issues. 1.' Institutional Issues 
It should be clear at this point in the discussion that any p4rticular 
irlGtituth,lnal format chosen tor A land rem{'te., sensing sateUite system would be 
derived from answers to a series of question:s regarding the kind ot political, 
internadonal, legal/regulatory and national ser.urity implications identified above. 
Whether the system is government owned, quasi-governmental or privately owned 
by either competitive or nlonopollstlc entities, there is no doubt that there wUl be 
vested in it such organlzational devices as are deemed necessary by the govern-
ment to assure that relationships between the system's operator and various public, 
foreign pollcy and national security interelllt.s are preserved. It is mast likely tha,t 
the ofRanizational framework for the U.S. land remote sensing ,ateUlte system 
whlcn is selected wiil be that which best; embodies the dominant set of poJitical, 
sodai and economic philosophies of the time, rather than a structure determined 
analytically to be optimum. 
Therefore, detailed attention is nut paid jn this section to an analysis of a 
variety of organizational alternatives. This is simply because institutional issues 
appear to be somewhat secondary when compared to other nonfinancial issues. 
GIven an agreement within Congress and the Executive Branch on what political, 
social and economic parameters should guide the establishment of the system, 
there is little doubt that a viable framework for the operational land remote 
sensing system can be designed. A historical example of such organizatioral 
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innovation was the creation ot the Communications Satellite Corporation 
(COM SAT). Once majority agreement was reached during the ,economic and 
political debate which occurred in the summer of 1962 over the appropriate 
framework for commercializing communication satelUtes, it was possible to design 
an imovadve organizational form which was sat1sfacto~y to most of the partici-
pants in the debate. There is no reason to think that in the case of the land remote 
"en sing sattfUite system the situation wUl be any different. Much of the 
controveny over various organizational forms in the case of both COMSA T and 
now land remote sensing, it appears, has actually been as a surrogate for debate 
over more fundamental issues of \1 ':onomic and poUtical philosophy. 
There are several comments which can be made with respect to institutional 
aspects of the remot.e sensing issue. One is that the structure of the federa! 
gov~rnment has proved Ul-matched to the task of developing and demonstra"ng a 
system which would lead to commercialization. A R&D agency, NASA, w&s 
res~onsible for the early stages of the U.S. land remote sensing program, and its 
actions in retrospect appear driven as ml.!ch by considerations of engineering 
development as by those of user requirements and market opportunities. The 
interim government operator of the system, NOAA, has had little opportunity to 
demonstrate whether it can be successful in creating a more user-oriented, 
operational style for the LANDSAT program. Many different f~deral agenCies, 
particularly Argiculture, Interior and the Central Intelligence Asency, are users of 
remote senSing data, but they have differing needs and priorities vif.i-a-vis remote 
sensing, and none seem wUling to make long-term commitments to data purchas~s 
and to using the output of the system in ways critical to their respective missions. 
This may be partly due to the lack of guarantee of continuity of service. A major 
argument against keeping remote sensing within a governmental framework (in 
addition to economic and political factors) is the limited evidence to date that this 
will result in a successful U.S. system in the long run. 
A second set of institutional issues relates to the government's role vi!3-a··vis 
any privately operated system. According to current policy; the Depa.rtment of 
Commerce (specifically, it would seem NOAA/NESDIS) will have responsibility for 
aggregating government requirements, specifying the conditions under which a 
private system will operate, and developing and implementing the regulatory 
*White House Fact Sheet, "National Space Policy." 
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framework for the systt:tm using the authority provided by Congreu AS part of the 
legislation transferring the operating franchise to a private entity. The point here 
is that NOAA has limited experience in any of these roles, and some sort of 
lnstitutiol,\&l and staff modUlcatlons are likely to be necessary to provide the 
capab111tles required. 
7.6 i!t .. eral Polley IS~J·~ 
Thl1 review of the vario'J' catego~lol of nQnflnancl:s1 issues has lod to the 
identif1eatlon t,)f several major pollcy concerns related to the viabUlty of the 
~'emot~ sensing venture, to the R&D requirements for the future success and 
continuity (If the systemJ and to the bahnce between public, governmental and 
private interests. 
In determining the appropriate institutional location for the permanent 
system, decisions must be made u to the extont of responsibUlty that the 
government wiU assume. For example, under continued government ownership and 
operation, commitments must be made to uses which may necessitate re-examlna-
fion C)f long-term budgetary requirements for affected agencies, Under private 
S~Cter cr.,ntrQi, cr it .. 'ria need to be set which wUl outUne the extent of the financial 
obligations the gO~t:trnment may have with the private sector entity, including 
provisions for possible failure of the systom due to successful competidve pressure 
or to general lack of demand for its products, For example, will g("'!rnment be 
asked to nationalize a failing venture because of its importance to national and 
societal interests, as well as to private interests? When a private venture is 
threatened by econornic competition from overseas systems, wi11 the government 
adopt protectioni.,t p\)llcies? Will the 81')vernrTIe"t's positive role include expanding 
international markets'? What steps and poJ1cy requirements would be raquired in 
th:! case of teehniCe'l1 !aUure; .. ,f the system? How much redundancy in the system 
wiU be required .,f Cl private operatur I .Jr oven a government-operated system, i" 
order to assure data continuity? WiU government retain the right to step in and 
laJnch its own satellites or to as!Sume some sort of managerial control over the 
private venture in the event of failure, economic or technif.:al, of the private sector 
operator? 
It is assumed that research on advanced remote sensing technology 'AliJJ 
continue to be carried out under government auspices, either through all active 
civiHan R&D program or in the context of meeting national security requirements. 
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Vet the extent and conditions for transfer of such government-developed tech-
noiogies to a privately operated system ,I, Imelear. Covernment hll not yet made 
an explicit commitment t\~ continue R&D on seniOr and processing technologies if 
op~rutiun ('Ii ene land remote senSing systf!m 15 in comnldrclul hands. In the clue ,,1 
.:orr.munjcn~lons sateUltel. the United States withdrew from R&D In relatl:!:l,J 
technologies In the early 1970. on the arounds that ,ince the private sector w.\r. 
I,perating communications sateUites, they should also be responsible for the R&D 
required for future systems. This policy WI ", reversed under the Carter Admin"· 
tration, and NASA in recent years has resumed its communications sateJUte R&D 
efforts. The grounds given for this policy reversal was that the private sector wali 
not dOing the basic work required to keep the U.S. competitive vis-a-vis other 
industrial countries. 
This suggests that a program of continued government R&D cannot, in fact, 
be assumed; NASA priorities may weU point elsewhere. Other problems likely to 
characterize any continued relationship between government and a private sector 
operator in the ar~i~, of R&D pertain to how decisions on the R&D are to bC't rnz-de 
and by whom. For instance, who is to determine what areas of R&D are most 
important and who is to say when a new technology is "operational?" Also, what 
restr ictiuns are to be placed upon use within governrnent of products resulting from 
R&D efforts, since potentially these could undercut the gov~rnment market for 
existing remote sensing imagery. 
• 
Of overriding importance is the recognition that there are both public and 
private Interests in land remote sensing and that the two do not necessarily alway~ 
coincide. It is important in Assellsing alternative sy~tp.ms to pay proper at~entlcn 
to determining the appropriate balance betwe\!n pubUc and private interests. This 
balance must be not only achieved prior to transfel', but should also be assessed 
throughout the subsequerlt Ufe of the system. 
In deciding on a strategy appropriate for transfer to private operation, it is 
important to keep in mind the fact that the public has invested well o\'cr Ii i,UJlon 
dollars 1n the developrnent of this capability to date. There arf! certain exp«.t;:.·, 
tillns, Im!sp~ctive cf recoupment con:siderations, about the cuntinued responsive~ 
ness of the lqstem to public interests. 'rhese expectntlons will persist whether the 
system is ha:\ded over to a monolloly, to competi'tlve enterprise or is designed In 
the formation of a public corporation. Numerous political difficulties and conflict!\ 
might arise if transfer to a private operator is attempted without some form of 
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m .. an1nsful competition. One reason tor thlt Ue. with b •• ic problems In de.ignin.a 
relul.tory",n'tlty whld\ i. effective in ics performance of lti public responslbUides 
and cauigr.e:t dutie.. If tran.fer i. thC'')uan ft noncompetitive, StJI..,·aourc:e Award, 
problema may develop as ca re.ult 01 ttle "eaotivity" '~at sometimes occurs when 1\ 
:l1nllle body functIons a. both user And relulator of the actlvitie. ot .... &ndu.try. 
On the other hand, the intereats of any prl\'ate s.ctor operatar of remott 
senllng mu.t also be protected. Various loreign policy, Internador.al. nationl~ 
security or domestic Intereat must be addrftss.d, yet regulati"nl should be 
tempered by cor.:ern» of commercial viability and econumlc stllnuladon. CAre 
mUlt be taken to enlure that the private entity I. not overresulatdd and Is able to 
operate over time in an efficient and profitable manner. 
1.7 PolicY Requirements • A Summary 
Whatever scenario is foUowed for creating a permanent operational frame-
work for the U.S. remote sensing 5ystem, It seems that government policy deaUng 
with the foUowlnl mu.t be deveJoped by the cooperadve e!forts of Congress and 
the ExeC'Jtlve Branch. 
• 
• 
• Relatjn~ a U.S. &ystern to other ~n.W!ls ~o n~-IJ.S. _4!.cr!!..~I2 internafonaI poUtlcal and leaal fac!.~!:! - fRete is an Inescapi6!e anter-
national dimension involving cooperatIon, cQOrdinf.\tlon and competition 
to any remote sensing enterl'risC!. How InternatJ.onal aspects w111 be 
integrated into !y'tom operlltiol' will remain a continuing policy chal-
I'!nge. 
• O~'lelo in a re ulator framework for s stem 0 eratio'l· Any system 
cpftrator wU ave to m"nage a remote sens ng enterprise within limits 
and requirements set by gO'iernment. That framfltwork ~houJd reflect 
13lanced agreement with resl'ect to a variety of conflicting natl:ma) 
"oal.s, objectives ann intere3ts relevant to remote sens'ng acti~Itles. 
Reacf\ing agreement un such a p"Ur.y frame',\'ork. giv~n other financial and 
nonfinancial issu"s reviewed so far in rhl.'l repurt, wiJI require creative policy 
making and a willingness to compromise, negotiate and "satisflce" with respect to 
the rnany private sector and public sector interests connected to remote sensing. 
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The previoul sectl';I','1 01 thla report reviewed several .conarlo. for senlna up a 
permanent framework, with an eye to determ!nln, whether one or another 01 these 
scenarlos t!J Inore Ukely to facUltate the needed agreement. As has been ,aid 
'~veral timl!"~ In this section, many of the choices to be made ilrc cholr.es betwf!(\In 
confUctlnl ~,\)a'i W\d vaJues, and thul are the kb\d 01 choice, be~t made for socioty 
through lu legitimate politicol authorities. 
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8. OBSERVATIONS/CONCLUSIONS 
~ene!1 r and cost. effectiveness !tudle~ pfl!rformed over the pa~t necad" have 
concluded that the potential ber.eflts trcm a t.ANDSAT systern would be on th'! 
order of 'url~reds of mllilons to a billlon dollars annlJally (2b-29]. With thes~ 
'm'fle potential benefits an obvious question Is why has commerciaUzatic;'1 not taken 
place: A likely answer to this question Is that a pubUc sector underta1dng, such as 
the LANDSAT program, can be justifl~d if it can be shown that the potential 
bemefi·ts from the program exceed pr'ogram costs. The benefits are to the public at 
large and there need not be a convenient mechanism for charging for benefits 
provided. The public sect.or's objective is to maximize societal benefits. A private 
sector busin~s5 venture may provide the same public benefits but the benefits of 
concern are those obtained by the business venture in t!'\e form of profits. The 
private sector objective is profit maximi.zatior •• 
It is very often the case that the objectives of profit maximization and 
benefit maximization do not co\ncide. This is normally the case when there is a 
lack of priCing me'1anisms that relate to benefits. To illustrate, consider a system 
that improves emergency cornmunications in rural areas. Studies have shown that 
this could lead to thousands of lives saved annually having economic value to 
society of hundr:!ds of millions to billions of dollars. However, commercialization 
is not likely to occur specifically for this application because there does not appear 
to be a pricin~ mechanism that can be related to the value of lives saved. 
For a business to achieve a profit requires revenue which in turn implies a 
pricing mechanism. Unfortunately, many of the potential benefits from Jand 
remote sensing have not been linked by a priCing mechanism; in other words they 
are a public good. 'fo date it appears that pricing mechanisms have only baen 
established based upon budgets that have been developed over time for providing a 
service (for example, obtaining imagery that will assist in the location of mineral 
deposits, and collecting wheat yield data and producing crop forecasts)-the value 
of LANDSAT data has basically been equated with the cost of collecting similar 
data by other rneans. Generally, budgets have not been increased because of the 
"added capclbJjity" or added value of thE: information products to society. Thus thl:' 
markets to (1il.te for l.ANDSAT type products have been related to existing data 
collection budgets. New or increased markets will only develop as an appreCiation 
f 
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develops for the added capabUlty and added value of the L\NOSAT type products. 
When budgc:ts are not increased to th., point where net benefits arc maximized 
~ht"C')ugh pri'/!.te sector actions, goverrment participation through ownership and 
operatil,n 01' l'ub8Jdizatlon may be ap~nCip:'iate in order to achieve the 50ciet:f.J 
beneilts that rnlght otherwise be foregone. 
The ob!\t"rvationr. and conclusions that may be arawn from the analyse'! 
r,!port~d i ... the Dre'itOUS pages have been grouped into thE: categC'rif!5 ~f OperatiC/ns, 
Financial and Nonfinancial. These are discussed below. 
8.1 ~bservations/Conclusio~: Op\!Irations 
LANOSAT n is currently providing land observation data. It has a finite 
life-possibly three years. \Vhen 0 fails it will he replar:ed with n'-this is not a 
certainty since launch reUabiUty Is not 100 percent. If 0' is placed into orbit 
successfully it is likely to last two to three years. If action is not taken swiftly, it 
is likely that both D and 0' will have faUed before a replacement is possible. This 
series of events, coupled with the expected competitive SPOT and other systems 
ilnd ':he need for uninterrupted service, poses a dilemma. 
Firs'!' tM need !or unintoerrupted service. Certain users (both U.S. and 
foreign) have come to rely on L.ANDSAT information products. An interruption in 
service may cause these users to revert back to pre-L.ANDSAT operations or to 
seek similar data from other sources, for example SPOT. Since the market 
(assuming uninterrupted service) for L.ANDSAT products is anticipated to be 
in;juffici~nt for commercialization, government support will be required to achieve 
a goal of commercialization. Therefore a 105s of any piece of the market (because 
o! an ir.terrupthm in serv,ce) can be significar,t 3.n'-' wl)uld have !I' be mQce up by 
additional government support. 
The dilemma is that the anticipated sequence of events dictates that rapid 
de~isions be made with resp~t ee, commercialization or retention. Insufficient 
information currently exists upon which to make the necessary informed decisions. 
Set::.mse of thf! magnitude of the costs and expenditures and procurement tirnes 
associat'!d with remote sensing, inappropriate deCisions rnay not be reversed for " 
tiecade or m:Jre. On the other har.d, inf'):'l1Ied decisions imply time delays while tht! 
neces!!ary In{ormatlon i3 ()btained upr,n which to base these decisions. Delays 
in(~rease the likelihood of service ir"t·.:e!"rl'~'tion. Therefore, informed decisions 
imply the need for all additional spacecraft to backup LANDS/IT 0'. This must be 
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initiated immediately if there is to be a high likelihood of continuity of service. It 
should be noted that doing rlothing implies either phase-out or interruption in 
service-bo~r. are good for competitive systems. 
The inability to be specific ahout launch vehicle cost is a contribution to the 
uncertainty s\Jrrounding a possible commercial venture. NASA has not establisheo 
de finitive plan5 with respect to the support of the DELTA launch vehicle beyono 
FY 86. Commercialization of the DELTA and other expendable launch vehicles i., 
uncertain. Shuttle pricing pollcy for WTR launches has not yet been established. 
Ariane is a possible alternative. This uncertainty with respect to the availability 
and cost of launch vehicles will affect private sector investn,ent decisions. 
8.2 Observations/Conclusions: Financial 
There arc many possible business systems that may bp. consider~d 8.S 
commercialization of the civil land remote sensing program. These range from 
short duration flights of Space Shuttle launched instruments with marketing and 
sale of collected data, to a combined land and weather remote sensing operational 
system with marketing and sale of information and value added products. Because 
of time constraints only one business system was considered in this study and this 
was not necessarily the best. The speCific business system was based upon 
providing uninterrupted ~ervice resulting from the continued use of LANDSAT 0 
and 0' phasing in, slightly before the demise of 0
'
, new satellites with 80M and 
later 30M serls-ors having stereoscopic capability. The following commercialization 
0" retention options wert: evaluated and compared under the above business system: 
• Continued ownership and -:>peration by the federal government (planned 
phase-out) 
• 
• 
Continued ownership and operation by the federal government <estab-
lishment of the necessary budgetary line items) 
Wholly privately-owned and operated by an entity competitively 
selected 
• Phased private ownership (government ownership and operation with 
private sector marl(etin~) 
• t.e~islatively-r.hartered. privately-owned corporation. 
"rhe analysir. .Jf these scenarios was developed based upon the same demand 
forecast and ~he same schedule of events. Government net cash flows were 
developed in all cases. For the private sector scenarios, financiaUy viable business 
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initiated Immediately if there is to be a high llkellhood of continuity of service. rt 
should be rj~ted that doing nothing implies either phase-out or interruption :n 
"er\'~ce-t:n~h ::ore good for competitive systems. 
T:-te inabitity to be specific about Launch vehicle cost is a I':ontribution to d~e: 
unc,-"r'tD.inty s\Jrrounding a possible commercial venture. NASA has not estabhsh~d 
dcfli1it\ve plans with respect to the ~upport of the DEL T.' launc:h ""hicle beycmd 
FY S6. Commerd.l1tlatior" of the DELTA and other expendable taunch vehicles is 
uncertain. Shuttle pricing policy for WTR launches has not yet been estabJished. 
Ariane is a possible 3lternative. This uncertainty with respeoct to the olva;!abiHty 
and cost of launch vehicles wHl Clffect private .. ector investment decisions. 
8.Z Observations/Conclusions: Financial 
There are rnany possible business systems t"at may be consid(;!'ed J:lS 
commerciaUzatlon of the civil land remote sensing program. 'rhese range from 
short duration flights of Space Shuttle launched instruments with markedng and 
sale of coUected data, to a combined land and weather remote sensing operational 
system with marketing and sale of inform.ulan and value added products. Secause 
of time con~traints only one business system was considered in this study and this 
was not necessarily the best. The specific business system was based upon 
providing uninterrupted sei'vice resulting from the continued use of LANDSAT D 
and 0' phasing in, slightly before the demise of 0', neVi satellites with 80M and 
later 30M sensors having stereoscopic capability. The following commercialization 
or retention options were evaluated and compared under the above business system: 
• 
• 
Continued ownership and operation by the federal government (planned 
phase-Qut) 
Continued ownership and operation by the federal government (estab-
lishment of 'the necessary PlJdgctary Hn~ 1 terns) 
• WhoUy privately-owned and operated by an entity competitively 
selected 
• Phased private ownership "oovernment ownership and operation with 
private sector marketing) 
• 'I.egislativcly.chartered. pl'ivately,·owned cClrporatlon. 
The analYSIS of these scenarios wa.ii d'~"~loped based ~pon th~ same demand 
forecast and the same schedule of events. Government net c.ash flows were 
developed in all cases. For the private sector scenarios, finanCially -'liable business 
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ventures were developed based upon achieving return on capital and other financial 
measures deemed necessary to achieve financing. The required rates of return 
were obtah~ed through the use of government subsidies. 
Undf!':'Jyin~ all of the commercialization or retention scenarios i!» a rnarl(et ')r 
demand forecast that is characterl:zet.i by great uncertainty. Thi$ is due to an 
insufficient understanding of the relationship of demand to information produc:t 
attributes such as price, resolution, and number and location of spectral band&. 
Ciovernment actions with respect towards emphasizing or enco'Jraging the use of 
land rernote sensing information may significantly influence demand. This is 
extremely important since there appears (for the busine'is scenario considered) to 
be insufficient demand for commercialization to take plar:e without 3ignificant 
government involvement through ownership and operation, subsidization or a 
combina tion of both • 
A basic decision that has to be made is whether or not the government will 
continue to participate thro'Jgh ownership and operation and/or subsidi; :ation or 
will withdraw from the remote sensing scerle. Withdrawal implies a contin~ing cost 
dither through the acquisition of information products or through benefits fore-
gone. Withdrawal decreases the likelihood of commercialization which in turn is 
likely to result in price increases from SPOT or other systems thi"ough reduced 
competition. Government withdrawal (Phase-out) can be the lowest cost alterna-
tive if potential benefits are not significantly larger than costs and the cost of 
information products does not rise significantly. 
Figure 8.1 SlJmmarizes the present value of government cash flo'w and 
average annual government cost associated with each of the considered commer-
cialization or retention scenarios. The cash flow and costs take into account 
government expenditures such as payments for information products, operations 
costs, R&D cost, subsidy payments and equity purchases. These may be offset by 
receipts (from the private sector) in the form <.If lease payments, asset recoupment 
payments, TDRSS fees, profit sharing or royalty on 'iales, generated tax revenup. 
and dividends. It is clear~ for the business scenario considered, that government 
phase-out can be the lowest cost (from a direct budgetary point of view, not 
necessarily t::"'Jm a benefits point of view) alternative. When considering continua-
tion of LA~i DSA T, the continued government ownership and opera.tion scenario 
results ir. the lowest cost approach. The government costs increase, though not at 
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FIGURE 8.1 PRESENT VALUE OF GOVERNMENT CASH FLOW AND GOVERNMENT 
AVERAGE ANNUAL COST AS A FUNCTION OF COMMERCIALIZATlON 
OR RETENTION SCENARIO (FULL GOVERNMENT RECOUPMENT) 
what might be considered a significant rate, as private sector involvement 
increase5 and govel'nment operationa.l in\'olvemf,mt 1ecree.!Ii~s. It should be n\)tect 
that!! private sector operations can be conducted more efficiently than !liimHar 
government operations then the indicated costs would be rl!ducl!d as private sector 
involvement increased H.e., the slope of the dashed lines decreases and th~ lines 
pivot about the cnntinued government ownership/operation costs). It should also be 
notec1 that, in ~eneral, a~ the private sector involvement increases 50 does thO! 
significance and complexity of nonfinancIal issues. 
Governrnent CI)SU associ~ted wl'th continuation of land remote ser,sing~ <ll".! 
anticipat~d to vary only Rlightly with the cornrnerc.ializati"n or rete:ntion scenarios. 
It is anticip~ted that government annllal costs will average on the order of $70 to 
$80 million (FY83$) through, and possibly beyond, 1994. The effect of asset 
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transfer and recoupment poUcy appears to be minimal. For example, for the 
private own<·rship and operation scenario, the present value of government costs is 
$1200 mHll',',I', with full f'Jpe.yment (recoupment) for government assets utiH:t.ed by 
r.he il~i·t'ate AC!Ctor vs. $1193 million wl'c.h 1'0 rfJcoupmcnt. Ave:rage I!.nnu:,l! 
government co:st (constant FY83$) is $82 mUllan 'Nith recoupment v ... $81 milH:m 
wich'.)ut rr.coupment. '1le effect 01 return on equity and cost of borrowing 11\ 
somewhat more significant though not a major factor. Reducing required return on 
equity and the cost of borrowing by approximately 20 percent (from return on 
equity of 17 p.:rcent and cost of borrowing of 11 percent to 14 percent and ., 
percent respectively) reduces average annual government cost from $82 miUion to 
$7' mUlion (constar.t FYS3$) for the private ownership and operation scenario. 
Sased upon the financial results, it is poslSible to make a plaus!!;,le case that 
full transfer to the private sector with the expectation of a viabJ.e, self-sustaining 
enterprise is premature by a number of years. Thus, if it is desired t~ continue 
land remote sensing then it is possible to argue that either 
• There is a justification for unusual degree of government support fill' transfer recognizing the high value of land remote sensing irtforr!1adon 
prodUCTS, the possible lack of pricing mechanisms tha t reflect tr.is value 
and the resulting high risk character of transfer to the private sector, 
0.1" 
• !her e is a need for continuing government leadership in this area with a 
limited but possibly gradually increasing private sector role. 
In addition to examining government costs, the alternatives to government 
!'~tention were s',udied from the perspective of a potential private seCTC" investor, 
In order to attain an acceptable rate of return, the alternatives to government 
retention involve either significant subsidy, or if the private sector takes on the 
marketing function, continued government ownership and operation of the space 
and ground segments. Of the private sector options considered, the latter appears to 
be the most attractive from the standpoint of financing (size of investment); 
h~'we'i~r, ~.U of the r)ptions to government retention share a cornplex set of 
Itonf.i.nancial prcblerns. On the ether ha.nd, should the governmen't choose to phase-
Jut LANDS,l·.r oper::&ticns, from a Ilul'ely financial 5tandpo1nt, it is not Hk",ly that 
tr.e private ~,ec:tor in trll! U.S. will s'U!P in ~d provide the same services that are 
currently fllmished by the federal governrnent without some form of subsidy. 
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8.3 Observa tlonI/Conclusi~n:n Nonfinancial 
The many nonfinancial iSlues assume differing degrees of importance or 
significance for each of the commercialization or retention scenariol. These are 
summarized in Table 8.1. 
Major nonfinancial iSSUl" are related to international, foreign policy and 
national s-.curity factors. Earth observation i8 a particularly sensitive activity 
internat!nnally because nations tc.lke the concept of ~overeignty seriously. Infor-
mation ootained on national re&ources is recogni~ed as increasingly valuable. All 
of this implies that Ilny framework selected for comml!rciallzation should include 
maximum assurance that no international confHcts will be created and no U.S. 
security or foreign policy intrrests unnecessarlly compromised. Thus, any private 
system wl11 need fairly close government oversight with respect to its international 
aspects. Otherwise, siRnificant potential exists for international problems. 
The history of earth observation as ~overnment-developed technology and 
mix~ publlc good/private good character of benefits from remote sensing combine 
\0 make trallSition to successful nongovernmental fr3.mewcrk for operation partic-
ulariy ditlicu:t. flequirements for commercial success may include pollticaUy 
fragUe government guarant~es and pollcy actions. Thus, maximum flexiblllty to 
revise public/private relationship and conditions under which system operatar 
functions should be retaIned I.n designing the initial framework for the system • 
as ! , snrm .. .~ .I. 
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9. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are presented based upon the premise that 
commercialization issues wUl persist. 
Because of the importance of decisions relating to cl)mmerciaUzatiol'l, and 
* the compressed timeframe for making these decisions which have long-term 
impUcations, it is recommend~d that a number of actions be immediately Initiated 
so that informed decisions can be made. It should be noted that initiation (by the 
government> of procurement of another LANDSAT sateJUte (beyorlo Of) would 
extend the window available for making the critical commerciaHzatlon decisions 
and allow more time for insuring that correct decisions ate made. 
It is recommended that analyses of the mechanisms of carrying out the 
transfer of remote sensing systems to the private ,;ectOI' continue. Specifically, it 
is recommended that: 
to: 
• An in.depth quantitative market analysis be undertaken that will lead 
to definitive market forecasts and provide an understanding of derr.and 
relative to information product price, resolution, number and location 
of spectral bands and other important product attributes. 
It is also recommended that the analysis techniques r~ported herein be tJsed 
• 
• 
• 
Continue the analysis and evaluation of other scenarir,)s for com· 
mercialization of civil land remote sensing systems and to consider the 
impact of other rnarket forecasu 
Analyze and evaluate potential value-added business scenarios olnd tt.' 
develop an understanding of their impact on and inclusion in com-
merciallzation scenarios 
Analyze and evaluate scenarios for the commercialization of tlt~ 
meteor-ological remote sensing system 
• Analyze and evaluate scenarios for the commerciaHzation of a C'JIn-
bined civil land remote sensing system and a meteorological remote 
sensing system. 
It is also recomme,ded that, in anticipation of the need to competitively 
select a commercialization alternative, evaluation criteria be developed against 
which commercialization proposals may be evaluated and then compared on 
* Driven by the timing of anticipated events such a!) the launch, opt-ration and 
demise (after several years, if everything goes according to plan) ~f 
LANDSAT D' and the time re~uired to acquire another LANDSAT sateUite 
and have it available for launch as a backup to Of. 
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a common basis. The selection of criteria can have a signiticant effect on which 
alternative w&U be selected. Such criteria u minimizatJon of govp.rnment sul,sidies 
and maximIzation of societal benefits should be considered-these will mOlt I1kely 
lead to the selection of significantly dUferent alternatives. As part of this eUort, 
sufficient analyses should be undertaken so that typical scenariol are developed In 
responSft to different postulated evaluation criteria. 
Since it is Uke!ly that ther,,, Is room for only one system for each major 
product clas5, and the NAtiction of the "'.vrong" s(ltern may ellmlnat~ the 
possibiUty for .. decade or more of achieving the "right" system, It Is also 
recommended that an analysis be performed of the impact that ncar-term dec!slons 
may have on long-term options. 
FlnaUy, since tt.e analysis and evaluation of pro~.,osals for commercialization 
wUl lead to the selection of a desired alternative, it is recommended that an in-
depth analysis be performed of each proposed alternative to establish estimates of 
the Ukelihood of success (both technical and economic) since faUure will at a 
minimum necessitate a government baU out, a discontinuity In Sftrvice or, In the 
wrJrst C3S~, the total eHmination of the ~c"vice. 
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APPENDIX A 
ANAl. YSIS OF SATEl.l.ITE. AND LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS 
SateUite and launch re·quirements are determined by the demand for opera-
tional on-orbit sensors, the nurnber of previous successful launches and the number 
of sensors that have failed due to random and wearout phenomena. Since failures 
occur randomly, the number of launch attemp.ts as a function of time is not known 
deterministically, but must be described in terms of a probability distribution. 
* A simulation model has been developed to assist with the programmatic 
evaluation of alternative approaches to establishing and maintaining a specific 
desired mix of operational sensors on spacecraft in geocentric orbit. Tne program 
enables the assessment of the effects of operational rectuirements and reliability 
(spacecnft support subsystems, sensors and transportation systems) on the time-
phased co.lits of alternative approaches to satisfying mission requirements. The 
prugram is specifically designed to allow for the explicit consideration of reli-
ability and cost uncertainties. in order to perform this evaluation, the launch 
systems and spacecraft (support systems ** and sensors) are ccr,sidered in detail 
from the points of v iew of reliability and cost. AU costs are treated as uncertainty 
variables where ranges of possible values are considered as well as subjective 
estimates pertaining to the form of the uncertainty (the probability distri!lution) 
within the range. The input to the program consists primarily of a set of numbers 
which d'·:scribes the demand for various operational sensors in "rbit as a function of 
time, the mix of sensors available per spacecraft type, the transportation system 
to be used for each spacecraft type as a function of time, spacecraft subsystem, 
sensor and transportation system reliability, subsystem and sensor nonrecurring 
costs including cost spreading and explicit quantitative uncertainty assessments, 
spacecraft and transportation system costs including explicl'i:!y quantitative un-
certainty assessments and cost learning rates. The output from the simulation 
program consists of a set of probability distributions associate:d with costs and 
events (i.e., number of launch a~tempts, etc.) as functions of time and the 
----; 
** 
Greenberg J.S., "The Economic Implications of Uncertainty," Proceedings of. 
!he Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposiu,!!l., January 1976. 
Greenberg, J.S. and G.A. Hazelrigg, "Methodology for Reli",oility-Cost-Risk 
Analysis of Satellite Networks," Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, Vol. II, 
No.9, September 1974. 
'rhe group of support systems is frequently ,i:ferred to as the spacecraft bus. 
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probability distribution of the present value of total recurring plus nonrecurring 
cost. 
The reliability, un1certainty and risk \15sessment capability embodied in the 
simulation model allows for: 
• Sp«ifl::ation ,.f the mix of operational sensors required in geocentric 
orbits as a funl::t1on of time. 
• Consideration of multiple spacecraft which are defined in terms of the 
reliability of the major support subsystems, the mIx of on-board sensors 
and their reliability and spacecraft cost. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Consideration of spacecraft subsystem and sensor failure models wrlich 
aHow for both random and wearout failures. 
SpecifIcation lInd consideration of multiple transportation systems which 
may consist oi current or new expendables or the Space Shuttle. The 
transportation systems may also include (as necessary) orbit-to-orbit 
shuttles or propulsion modules (for example, Agena, Centaur, Space 
Tug, etc.). The propulsion modules may be expendable or reusable and 
may be used for placing spacecraft in orbit and retril!ving spacecraft 
which faU and require replacement. The speCification of the transporta-
tion systems include cost and reliability assessments. Reliability is 
considered at the major subsystem level. 
Speciflclltion of transportation systems to be utilized for pJacing 
different spacecraft into orbit as a function of time. Changing the 
specification of transportation system-spacecraft assignment as a func-
tion of time allows performance capability (such as allowable mission 
modes and reliability) and cost variations to be considered. 
Explicit consideration of muLtiple time periods thus aUowing for annual 
co:;ts to be established. 
• Consideration of cost learnmg curves. 
• AU costs to be treated as ur.cer't.ainty variables. 
The simulation model, taking into account the required numb.:!r of sensors as 
a function of time, number of operational sensors in orbit (as determined from 
spacecraft subsystem and sensor reliabHity characteristics) and spacecraft and 
launch costs, determines a near optimal mix \Jf spacecrdt Jaunchp.s as il function of 
·time. Since the simulation is based upon Monte Carlo techniques, it is possible to 
establish the probability distributions of pertinent performance measures, which 
allows alternatives to be compared by considering both expected values of 
performance measures and the chance of variatkm (i.e., the ri.'ik) of the 'Ialue of 
the measures. SpecHicaUy, the simulation m;)dei establishes the probability 
distributions of: 
• Pertinent quantities by year (for example, number of launch attempts, 
number of spacecraft required, numbel' of propulsion mpdules required, 
number of propulsion module refurbishments, etc.) 
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• Launch, spacecraft and total costs by spacecraft type and by year 
• Bus and sensor nonrecurr ing costs 
• Present value of recurring pl'JS nonrecurring costs. 
The sensors mix as a function of time, as c,tabJished from Figure 3.1, was 
used as the sensor demand in a simulation analysis. The purpose of this analysis 
was to obtain insight into the number of spacecraft that should be prncur"d in 
order to achieve a reasonable likelihood of continuity of service and the number nf 
launch attempts that are likely to be required. The scenario described In 
Figure 3.1 was simulated or flown 1,000 times taking into account sensor and 
spacecraft support system ralldom and wearout failures and the p,·obability of 
major launch events being successful. The assumed demand for sensors is 
iUustrated in Table A.l, the assumed sensor and subsystem reliabiJities are 
indicated in rable A.2 and the launch vehicle (Delta) assumed rel1abiJities are 
indicated in Table A.3. 
Since an expendable launch vehicle is utilized, the probability distribution of 
the number of launch attempts and the probability distribution of the numlJer of 
spacecraft required are the same. These are summarized in Tabie A.1i a$ a 
function of time in terms of expected values and standard deviation. 
The results of the simulation analysis indicate that a minimum of two 
spacecraft of each type will be required. The likelihood of continuous service with 
the purchase of two spacecraft is not high and a third spacecraft acquisition ma}' 
be desirable. 
TABLE A.l ASSUMED SENSOR DEMAND (NO. OF REQUIRED SENSORS IN ORBIT) 
SENSOR FISCAL YEAR 
'85 '87 '89 '91 '93 
MSS (80M) 1 1 , 
" " " 
0 
" 
0 ~ , 
TM (30M)* 
" " " " " " 
13 13 13 
" MLA (80M) 13 13 13 1 1 1 1 1 " 
13 
MLA ( 3Of4) 
" " 
0 0 13 13 13 1 1 1 
* LAUNCH DOES NOT TAKE PLACE UPON FAILURE OF THE THEMATIC MAPPER. 
~~::---=--~'--------- '''..- ~ W4'#.r"" -p:. ';;.:-" -----..i. ... ____ ~ - . ---- --
(.)' 
, 
• 
120 
T.\DLl h.2 ASSlIMED SENSOP AND SUBSYSTEr~ RELIABILITY 
/'lEAN· r I ME· TO· Ei.PE.CTED VARIABILITY OF 
SEN$ORISUaSY~TEM FAILURE (MTBF) Io:EAROUT WEARQUT LI rE· (YEARS) L1H (VEAII!') (YEARS) 
r~s~ 20 3 .5 
TM 10 3 .5 
MLA i30M) 25 5 .5 
r'ILA (30M) 20 5 .5 
POWER 30 Ii .5 
AVCS 3G S .5 
COMII,UrH C:~ TlONS 30 5 .5 
TUC 30 5 .a 
STRUCTURI:: 40 5 .5 
• STANOARD DEVIATION 0): IoIEAR0ur L:Ft::. 
1 , 
TABLE A.3 LAUNCH RELATED RELIABILITIES 
ITEM VALUE 
-
I • FROOABILITY OF ~PACECRAFT FUNCTI0~ING 0.95 PROPEPL1 ~HfN PLACED IN FINAL ORBIT 
• PROBABILITY OF BOOSTER SUCCESS 0.98 
• PROBABILITY OF UPPER STAGE SUCCESS 0.98 
• PROBABILITY OF ORBIT INJECTION SUCCESS !J.98 
TABLE A.4 LAUNCH ATTEMPT STATISTICS 
-r--- - --- . 
SPACECRAFT TYPE 
----------
rISr,\L YEAR 
'~5 '67 '9? '91 '~3 -~ --- '-- t • I I t . . , LANDSAT E (~L~/80M) 
1 EXPECTED ~O. OF r. 
" 
;') 1.20 0.19 0.22 0.25 ,ua 
" 
i) 
LAUNCH ATTEMPTS 
• STD. ~EV. OF NO. 
" " " 
0.84 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.61 
" " OF LAUNCH ATTEHPTS 
-
LANDSAT F (MLA/3m~) 
• eXPECTED NO. OF 
" 
a 
" 
~ 0 
" " 
1. 11 0.17 0.19 
LAUNCH ATTEt-1PTS 
• STD. OEV. OF NO. a 
" " " 
0 ;') 0 0.65 0.39 J.4i 
J~ L~UNCH ATTEMPTS 
. .". 
--~--------------,-----~,,--"---.----.--' 
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APPENDIX 8 
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION FOR INPUT 
DATA TO FINANCIAl.. ANAl.. YSES 
(1) Revenue - Supporting data is presented in Section 4.4, Market Forecast. In 
panicular, reference is made to Figures 4.' and ~.6. AU data in these figlJres 
are in constant 1983 dollars. A 6 percent inflation rate was used to escalat~ 
the figures to 198' and following years. 
(2) Additional Federal Purchases - Corresponds to the annual subsidy that is 
required in order to achieve a desired annual return on assets. The subsidy is 
determined through an iteration process wherein the value h adjusted untIl 
the desired rate of return is achi~ved. 
(3) Processing Cost/Scene-80M - Processing costs include those costs involved 
with the processing and handling of data trom the moment of receipT at 
GSFC until its expedition to EDC. For MSS data, the primary activIties are 
to make radiometric corrections~ indicate the n"Jed for geometric corrections 
and record the data on high density tapes 'Nhich wiU be used to transmit th.., 
data via sateUite to E.DC. For TM data, the functions performed at GSFC' 
include receipt and recording of data on high density tapes (to remain at 
GSFC until transfer to federaJ archives) plus creation of photographic 
negatives and computer compatible tapes (CCTs) from these high density 
tapes, which wiU be mailed to EDC. The foUowing determination of the 
processing cost/scene for 80 meter information products is based upon data 
provided by NOAA and is based upon processing 1.36 scenes daily. 
Cost Category Cost ($1.000) 
Operations and Maintenanc:! 
High Density Tapes 
Computer Compatible Tapes 
Computer Tape Drive 
Performance Assessment 
Photo Support 
Total Annual Cost (FY83$) 
Total Annual Cost (FY85$) 
7,148 
215 
20 
20 
...1.50 
8,353 
9,.385 
Processing Cost/Scene (80M) = Total Annual Cost x Cloud Factor = $270.30 
Scenes/Year 
, 
I 
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~\ 
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wlth a cloud factor equal to 1.1f3. The cloud factor (see Note 6) multipUer i.1 
used to account for the fact that the financial model is driven by scenes sold 
and not scenes processed. 
Processing Cost/Scene-30M - The following determination of the processing 
cost/scene for 30 meter information products is based upon data provided by 
NOAA. The processing cost 15 the inr,;remcntal COSt of p"ocessing '0 
30 meter scenes dally in imagery and tl!n scenes nally on tape, given that 136 
MSS SO meter scenes are being processed daUy. (Refer to Note 3 for a 
description of what l~ included in the current processing C08tS.) 
Cost Category Cost ($1,000) 
Total HOT & CCT Tape 
& Handling 
Photo Support 
Ground Segement Operations 
& Maintenance 
Total Annual Cost (FYS3$) 
Total Annual Cost (FYS'$) 
2,6'2 
',632 
6,328 
Processing Cost/Scene (30M) = Total Annual Cost x Cloud Factor = $49'.80 
·Scenes/Year 
with a cloud factor equal to 1.43. The cloud factor (see Note 6) rnultiplier is 
used to account for the fact that the financial model is driven by scenes sold 
and not scenes processed. The above cost per scene is based upon 18~2.50 
scenes per year. . 
(,) Pro,£essing Learning Factor - It is assumed that processing cost for repetitive 
functions will tend to decrease with time because of learning. A typical 
learning equation, as indicated below, has been utilized to predict future cost 
reductions. 
1..(I) ~~ ~!l~ear 1 = l[1og10(CA1..R) - 2.01/.301 
Cost case 
The learning factor, 1..(1), indicates the cost in the Ith year reiative to the 
current or base cost. The assumption i:; that costs are reduced by 100-CA1..R 
percent every time the number of years doubles. CA1..R represents the 
cumulative average learning rate (%). The processing learning factor is based 
upon a 90 percent learning curve. The specific values utilized are presented 
below along with learning factors based upon other learning rates. 
\, 
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. LEARNING FACTOR, L(I) 
FISCAL YEAR LEARNING RATE, CALR 
~-
95% 90S 85S 80% 
'85 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
186 
.95 .90 .85 .80 
'87 .92 .85 .77 .70 
'88 .90 .81 .72 .64 
'89 .89 .78 .69 .60 
'90 .88 .76 .66 .56 
'91 .87 .74 .63 .53 
'92 .86 .73 .61 .51 
'93 .85 .72 .60 .49 
'94 .84 .70 .58 .48 
(6) Proces!ling/Sales Factor - Thls f.actor accounts for the difference t,etween 
scenes archived and scenes sold, since archived scenes may be sold more t"an 
once while other scenes may not be sold at all. 
Processing/Sales Factor = +~!:f ~:~:: ~lcrt~1yst2~og~~I~::tor 
The cloud factor represents an adjustment since scenes with significant cloud 
cover are handled in a somewhat different manner. Scenes received at 
Goddard Space Flight Center are flagged during processing to high density 
tape if the cloud cover is great enough to render the scene obscure. Although 
these scenes are currently processed for archiving at EOC, it is assumed that 
a decision will be made not to further process these obscure scenes, which 
are estimated at about 30 percent of the total. Therefore, the number of 
scenes processed (at GSFC) equals the number of scenes transmitted from 
* White Sands, but scenes archived at fOC will be reduced from scenes 
processed by a "cloud factor." It should be noted that: 
No. of Scenes Transmitted from White Sands = No. of Scenes Processed at GSFC 
No. of Scenes Archived = No. of Scenes Processed/CF 
No. of Scenes Sold = No. of Scenes Processed/(CF x AF) 
CF = Cloud Factor = 1.4.3 
AF = Archival or Processing/Sales Factor = 0.'2 
* Scenes with too much cloud cover will be recorded on the high density tape 
(HOT) and retained in the archives, but it is assumed that further processing, 
such as producing a film master, will not be done. 
.'~'i1 ' 
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The c',oud factor of 1.43 is based upon 30 "bad" scenfts out of 100 scenes (i.e., 
70 "good" scenes). Therefore, to get 70 good scenes it il necessary to process 
100 sc' ,es or 1.41 times the 70 scenes. To go from scenes processed to good 
scenes it is necessary to divide by 1.43. 
. . 
(7) Archival Cost/Scene-SOM - Archiving costs are costs incurred in receiving 
data at EOC, proces:ling data into format required for archiving and 
maintainins the archi,,~s. I., the calle of MSS data, atter the receipt of data 
from GSFC it is recorded on high density tapes. Scerles from the high density 
tape are processed to film images which are sent to the photo lab and a 
master made. The high density tapes and fUm masters are then archived. 
When EDC receives a TM film image frl)m C;SFC it makes a master fUm 
image for storage in tho archives. The CCT it receives is 5tor~d in the 
archive after a copy is made for the cllent. TM archiving costs include the 
cost of making the fUm master plus cost of receiving and cataloging the data 
and maintaining the database. 
Cost Category 
Da.ta Receipt c5c Catalog 
Data Processing & Archive 
Creation 
Archive Database Maintenance 
Total Annual Cost (FYS3$) 
Total Annual Cost (FYS'$) 
Cost ($1,000) 
669 
1,3'8 
.J.!t! 
2,17' 
2,44' 
Archiving Cost/Scene (80M) = $49.70 
(based on archiving 49,27' scenes/year) 
(8) Archival Cost/Scene-30M - Since data is not currel,tly available on aU f.)f the 
TM archiving costs, ilpproximations are necessary and are based upon :scaling 
of MSS costs 35 follcws. (Refer to Note 7 far what is included in archiving 
costs.) from Note 7, the average cost of I'ecelpt and catalog ($669,000) and 
archive database maintenance ($14S,000) is $S17,000 for MSS scenes. This 
reduces to $16.(;,0 per scene. Sincl' the number of items (film images or 
computer compatible tapes) should be about 1.7' times greater (TM has seven 
spectral bands whereas the MSS has four spectral bands) than produced for an 
MSS scene, it is assumed that the cost of receipt, cataloging and archive 
database maintenance for TM data is 1.7' times that of MSS data or $29.00 
per scene. An approximate cost of making a working fUm master for storage 
~- . 7' .:-? 'f 
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in tho archive is $79.40 per TM scene. Therefore, the average cost to archive 
a TM scene is $108.40 FY8.3$ or $121.80 FY8'$. 
(9) Archival Learning Factor - A learning rate of 90 percent has been assumed. 
Soe Note' ::or detaUs. 
(10) £.ost of Sales/Unit - Sales costs are those costs involved in reproducing 
scenes for sale to the public, and distributing the scenes. FUm images are 
made from the fUm master which is stored in the archives. CeTs are mAde 
from the archived high density tape in the case of MSS data, and from the 
CeTs received from GSFC for TM data. 
MSS estimated cost for reproduction and sale of approximately 78,7'0 fUm 
scenes is as follows I 
CQst (S 1 ,00.22 
Product Generation'" Dissemination 1 ,480 
Customer Interface 64:> 
2,m 
Thls results 1n MSS film cost of $27.00 FY 8J$ or $30.30 FY 8'$ per scene. 
MSS estimated cost for reproduction and sale of approximately 4000 CeT 
scenes is as foUc.lw:s: 
Product Generation'" Dissrnenination 
Customer Interface 
Cost ($1,000) 
43' 
215 
6'0 
Thls results in MSS tape cost of $162.'0 FY83$ or $182.60 FY8'$ per scene. 
TM costs are estimated to be 7/4 (tne ratio of TM spectral bands to MSS 
• spectral bands) times the MSS costs. Therefore, TM film and tape costs are 
estimated a. $'.3.10 and $.319.60 FY8.s$ per scene, respectively. 
• 
• 
• 
(11) Cost of Sales Learning Factor - A learning rate of 90 percent has been 
assumed. See Note , for details. 
(12) !!!S!lrect Lab2r., - Indirect labor costs are those costs that are independent of 
the number of scenes processed and include managemt'!nt, spacecraft mo·· 
neuvering and positioning, and building operations and maintenance. These 
costs are as follows: 
Cost Cate82Q'. 
Building Operations'" Maint. 
Spacecraft Orbital Element 
NOAA Management 
Cost ($1,0001 
1,651 
120 
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Communications-Telex Link 
to Foreign Stations 
8uUding 28 Local Communi-
cation 
NOAA Administrative Costs 
at EOC 
Total Annual Cost (FYI3$) 
Total Annual Cost (FYS,$) 
110 
4' 
32 
-
R&D· It is usumed that NASA w111 continue to ulld~rt.ake r"S'!:uch and 
--development relating to new sensors and rel3t.ed technologies Ilnd new 
info, mation c!xtraction techniques. It is assumed that the government ~~J) 
expenc:aitures will be on the order of $10 rnUUon per year. It 15 assumed that a 
private sector business venture (Scenario 3) wUl undertake R&D to improve 
computational efficiency and inf",'m,Uion products. It 13 estimated that the 
cost (fully burdened) of a profeulonal involved in the R&D is $90,000 per 
year. It is assumed that the R&D organization should include approximately 
ten professionals ($900,000/year) and wUl increase as sales buUd over time 
and ;,chieve a level of. 4 p~!'t:~nt of tales,. Therefore, R&D costS will be 
$900,000 per year or 1£ percent of sales. whichever is greater. 
U 4) Marketing, Advertising & Promoti0'l. Marketing, advertising and prornotion 
includes customer interface, mark~t development and applications engi-
neerlng as well as the other sal~s-orie=nted f!.lnctions. ~t is assumed that the 
average cost per salesperson 15 $"8,000 ($4',000 in compensation multiplied 
by 2.' for overhead and G&A, plus $4',000 in expenses). It is assumed that 
there are 1.' protessional persons supporting each salesperson at a CO!lt of 
$n,OOO-$8'~OOO per year. Therefore, the effective cost per sale:rperson 15 
$278,000 per year. 
As a minimum, it is aSluJmed that one salesperson ~ required for toreign raaies 
(mainJ, keeping and getting new ground stations), one sa.lesperson is required 
for federal sales, two salespersons are required for industria! and state/local 
government/academic sales. Therefore a minimum market organization is as 
foUows: 
4 salespersons 
6 professional support 
1 management 
($6',000 x 2.') 
__ -';0 
} $1,110,000 per year 
} $ 160,000 per year 
$1,270,000 per year 
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H is allumed that this marketing organization wUl increase with sale. 
reaching an expenditure level of , percent of sales. Therefore, Marketing, 
Advertising & Promotion Costs wUJ be $1,42.',000 FYS,$ per year or 
, percent of sales, whichever is greater. 
(U) Communications Costs (TDRSS) - Thls represents the cost of transmitting 
data through the Tracking Data Relay SateWte Systern from LANDSAT to 
the White Sands ground receiving station. Charges are based on a per minute 
rate depending on type of access. 
A typical transmission lasts approximateiy 26 minutes and consists of a mix 
of the different types of access. This occurs approximat~ly 20 times per day. 
During each 26 minute intllrval seven MSS and flve TM scenes (on average) 
.. 
are transmitted. The average cost for a typical transmission is 
Access 
Single Access 
Multiple Access Forward 
Multiple Acce". Return 
Therefore, 
I!m! 
14 minutes x 
2 minutelll x 
10 minutes x 
Cost per Minu..!!. 
$91 
~2i 
Total COlit 
Per Event 
$1,274 
40 
60 $17»4 
$1,374 = 7 x cost of transmitting MSS scene + .5 )( cost of transmitting TM 
scene 
It is estimated that the cost to transmit a TM scene wUl be '.67 times that of 
.. 
•• 
•• an MSS scene. The cost to transmit an MSS scene is therefore $.38.90 
(FY83$) or $43.70 (FYS'$). Tnis must be multiplied by the cloud factor (refer 
to Note 6) so that the total cost per MSS scene is $62.'0 (FY 8'$). Similarly, 
the total cost (including the cloud factor) for transmitting a TM scene is 
$3'4.10 (FYS'$) • 
The analysiS is based upon the use of rates for nongovernmental users rather 
than rates that will be charged to NOAA, because the former is likely to be 
more representative of the true costs of u,ing TOR SSe 
TM data is trar ted at the rate of 8' mf'~abits per c;ecJnd and MSS data at 
the rate of 1· -"abits per second. Both require 24 seconds for a scene to 
arrive at Whlte Sands (net of any time that the satellite Isn't collecting 
usable data) • 
ksWSi' ... ''<' --,..--.,. '*' 
.... I..L ____ ~ ___________ ._..lo.__~ ______ _ 
r.), 
• , 
I 
, 
II 
...... 
128 
(16) Communications Costs (OOMSAT) - Thl.l repr.tsents the COlt of transmitting 
data via the Oomest\c Communk.ations Satelllte System. 60th TM and MSS 
dwta are transmitted from White Sands to GSFC using the DOMSAT '0 mega-
bit link. MSS data Is sent to fOe from GSFC on the DOMSAT 20 :negabll 
llnk (TM data i. maUed). 
(18) 
The cost of using the L)OMSAT '0 megabit Hnk b $J.'O/minute. Includ'''8 
It 
set-up and other overheAd time. it take. an 'ucimated 48 stfconds for • ., MSS 
scene and 72 seconds for a TM scene to arrive at GSFC. Therefortl , MSS 
DOMSA T cost ill 
MSS DOMSAT Cost. 0.8 minutes/sr:ene x $J.'/min I: $2.S0/scene (FYS3$) 
It is assumed that the cost to transmit an MSS scene to EDC from CiSFC 1. 
approximately the same as transmitting from White Sands to GSFC, $2.80. In 
addition, an inventory tape (GHIT) la communicated by phone to EOC Md this 
costs about $.90 per scene; therefore totQl cost to send an MSS scene from 
White Sands to EDC Is $6.'0 (FYS3$) or $7.l0 (FYS'$). This must he 
multiplied by tt • .: cloud factor (ref~r to Note 6) so that the total C~!lt per MSS 
~c~ne is $10.40. 
The cost to send a TM scene from White Sands to CSFC is: 
TM DOMSAT Cost:: 1.2 minutes x $3,'/mln :I: $4.20 (FY83$). 
Adju'ting to FYS' and multiplying by the cloud faeter yields $6.70 per scene 
(FYS'S). 
,LDRSS Lea~e Costs (AnnY!.1l - Thla represents the tease costs associated with 
the Tra",klng Data Relay SateHite System which arc independent of usage. 
S1.nt:e TDRSS c~sts have been assumed to be directly proportional to scene" 
~ld, this fixp.d annual cost hu been HIt equal to :fefO. 
DOMSAT L.ease Costs (Annual) - Thl,! represents the leQs,", costs associated 
._----....... - ---
with the DOMSAT communication system which are independent of usage. 
Since DOMSAT costs have been a'5umed to be directly proportional to scenes 
sold, this fixed annual cost t.css been set equal to zero. 
--
* rime during which the system ls turned on but not coUecting useful data. 
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(19) Lease Costs (LANDSAT 0 and 0') - It is assumed that for Scenarios 3 and " 
LANDSA T 0 and 0' are transferred to the pr ivate Gaector business venture. 
Different recoupment payment policies are considered. tease costs are zero 
for Scenarios t, 2 and 4 since it is assumed that transfer of these assets is 
through non lease arrangements. 
(20) Lease Cost:, (Ground Facl1iti~s-GSFC, fDC, White Sands and Nongovernm~.ll 
It is assumed that, initially, ground facility assets are leas\1!d from the 
government (operating leases with no transfer of title). It is assumed that in 
1989 all faci11ties are consolidated at White Sands at which time ledses are 
entered into with nongovernment organ1zations. It is a~sumed that the lease 
policy is to recoup a fraction (0 to 1.0) of the book value of the leased asset 
through an annuity such that the present value of the annuity is equal to 
c5 )( Book Value where c5 is the fraction of the book value recouped and bO.Jk 
value, BV, is given by 
BV = Acquisition Cost x [usefuL Life us~r~rUfe ~rvir.:e ] • 
And the value of the annual annuity payment, A, is given by 
A - c5 x B V )( r /100 
- 1-1/(l+r/100)M 
Where r = cost of capital 
M = number of payments for establishing lease rate. 
The following schedule is assumed: 
FY 
' 86 '88 '90 
GSFC LGSFC IOGSFC LGSFC LGSFC 
EOC LEOC LEOC LEor; LEnc 
WHITE SANDS L~IS LwS LwS LwS Lws LWS LwS 
NONGOVERNMENT LNG LNG LNG 
'92 
LWS L~IS 
LNU LNG 
'94 
Lw: 
LrjG 
" 
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The venture initiaUy leases facUities (CiSr-C proces~ing facilities, cDC 
processing and archiving facUities, and White Sands tracking and communica-
tions facilities) from the go~ernment. The5e lea,e rates are l.CSFC' l.EDC 
and l.WS• ~ her consolidation the venture leases similar equipment to be 
located at White Sands. It is assumed that the lease r~te of White Sands 
eI',Juipment is smaU relative to that at GSFC and EOe. Th~ lease ra~e of the 
equipment to ~e acquired and located at White Sands 13 appro"imat~d as 
follows: 
where E is an efficiency factor relating to the consolidation of the EDC and 
CiSFC data processing faCilities, I. is a learning factor (it is assumed that 
both processing algorithms and equipment improve with time) (refer to Note 
, for a discussi"n of learning factors) and IGSFC is the effective lease rate 
paid on equipment not require .. d at the combined facility. 
A 90 p~rc~nt iearning rate is ~ssllmed. Therefore 1. = 0.78. It is assumed 
that ~he cost of computers to thf! government has a profit built in for the 
private ~~ctor. When the commercial entity leases a computer from the 
private sector there is also a profit for the private sector. It is assurned that 
these are basically the same on a percentage basis. NOAA has estimated 
equipment costs at GSFC to be approximately $101 mi11ion and EDC has 
estimated equipment cost associated with LANDSAT at EDC to be approxi-
mately $14 million. 
The following lease rates have been es'timated and used in the analysis: 
a V(GSFC) = ~ 1 f.I i miUion x r 8 yrs. useful life - 2 y.,'s. eri2r...!£~~art of lea~.] 
." L 8 yrs. usetul hte 
BV(EDC) = $14 million x lr-8 yrs., useful1ife .. 4 yrs. p~ior to start of lease] 
8 yrs. useful hfe 
A t a cost of capital of 10 percent, 
LGSFC = 101 x (88~) x .10/[ 1-1/1.10)4] = $23.9 million 
LEDC = 14 x (884) x .10/[ 1-0/1.10)4] = $2.2 million 
l.NG = (23.9 + 2.2) x .78 x .90 -2 = $16.3 million 
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where E = .90 and ICSFC = $2 million. 
Since the lease at White Sands starts in 1989, LNG must be adjusted from 
FY83 to FY89 dtll!o\r:. by multiplying by 0.06)6. The result is 
LNG = $23.12 million FY89$ in FY89 and beyond. 
(21) Assets: Ground Segment - It is assumed that all ground segment equipment is 
leased. Therefore the asset value of the ground equipment is zero. 
(22) Space Segment - The following is a summary of the launch costs and the 
availability of launch vehicles. LANDSAT D consists of the NASA standard 
Multi-Mission Modular Spacecraft (MMS) and a mission-unique sensor module. 
LANDSA T D was launched into a nominal 42' n mi sun synchronous polar 
orbit by a Delta 3920 launch vehicle from the U.S. Western Test Range. 
The MMS is designed to be compatible for launch from both the Delta and the 
Space Shuttle Orbiter. However, the long (14' length) and narrow (7' width) 
configuration of LANDSAT D is not optimum from a cost standpoint for 
Shuttle launch. As the MMS is designed for compatibility with the Delta and 
Shuttle, it wiU also be compatible with the Ariane launch vehicle. These 
three launch vehicles constitute the primary candidates for further launches 
of LANDSAT spacecraft in the configura tion of LANDSAT D. Other ex-
pendable launch vehicles such as proposed commercial versions of the Atlas-
Centaur or Titan could also be used; however, the use of these launch 
vehicles would n.ecessitate d(.~ign modifications in the spacecraft. Moreover, 
there are no plans at the present to achieve a near polar orbit capability with 
the commercial TItan. 
For the purpose of o!ltaining launc:h cost information it was assumed that the 
future LANDSA 1" spacecraft would be similar :n physical characteristics and 
orbit requirements to LANDSAT D. Launch dates of January 1987, January 
199 I and Jan'Jary 1996 were used to solicit launch cost information from the 
operators o{ the Ariane, Delta and Shuttle. 
The results of these enquiries indicate that the launch vehicle area is in a 
state of flux and it is difficult to obtain costs that can be used with a great 
deal of certainty for the prospective launches. At the present time the Delta 
Program Office does not plan to continue to supply the Delta launch vehicle 
after its use for two GOES missions in FY86. In response to this enquiry, 
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NASA quoted a cost of about $" million In FYS' dollars for a Delta launch 
prior to the termination of the program in FYS6. NASA was unable to quote 
costs beyond this date because of the planned termination of the Delta launch 
vehicle. Informal discussions of the proposed launches with NASA Shuttle 
marketing personnel indicate that NASA has not yet formulated a pricing 
policy for WTR launches. Moreover. the published Shuttle pricing policy does 
not extend beyond FY 88. In the absence of a pricing policy tha t extends to. 
tlte time .,eriod of inter~st for WTR, it was ~uggested that the piicc of a 
Shuttle launch from WTR would be aoout the same as that from ETR. 
Because I)f the spacecraft configuration, weight and orbit requirements. 
LANDSAT would probably require a dedicated Shuttle launch. The suggested 
price for a dedicated Shuttle lEaunch from WTR was about $40 mUllon in 197' 
dollars. Discussions with Arianespace indicate that the L.ANDSAT launch 
would require the Ariane 40 vehicle. Funding for the development of the 
Ariane 4 series of launch vehIcles was approved in 1382 and it is expected to 
be operational in 1986. . Discussions with Arianespace indicate that the 
budg~'tary price frJr an Ariane 40 launch is $60 million to $6' million in 1982 
dollars. 
On the basis of this brief survey, it is clear that the Shuttle will be supported 
from WTR. On the other hand, it is not cleEar that any of the current U.S. 
e·"",endabie launch vehicles will be supported from WTR post FY86. One 
possible sce~ario for this time period might postulate competition between 
two or more U.S. launch vehIcle, ana perhaps the Ar.iane. Although NASA 
now indi.cat~s that it will not suppor~ the Delta in the post FY86 time period; 
it is posswle that competition wi!! drive the price of competing lallnch 
syst~rTls tl) that quoted for the Delta, or that a commercial version of tl-,e 
Delta wiIJ be developed as one of the competitors. In view of the dear price 
advantage of the Delta 391.0, the price of the Delta 3920 was used as the 
basis for estimating launch costs for the prospective LANDSAT launches. 
Assets: Space Eguipment - The space equipment assets include L.ANDSAT 0, 
0', E, E', F, F', G and G'. These are procured at different point!. on time with 
both D and D' having already been procured. 
Data from GSFC indicates a total cost of $361 million for 0 and 0'. It is 
assumed ·that this cost is divided evenly between 0 and 0'. Therefore 
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LANDSAT 0 Book Value = (180 + 3'] x 
= $71.7 million 
[3 yr. Ufe-2 yrs. used by '8'] j yrs. lIfe 
LANDSAT 0' Book Value = (180 + 3' + 33] x (1] 
= $248 million 
.. 
where it has been assumed that the Delta launch cost is $35 million and D' 
storage cost is $33 miUlon. 
The following cost estimates (in millions of dollars) have been made for the 
post-D'sateUites: 
LANDSAT 
f. E' F F' 
SPACECRAFT 40x(I.06)5 40x( 1. 06)~ 40:«1.06)6 6 40x(1.06) 
MLA (80M) 50x( 1.06) 10x( 1.06) 
75x( 1.06)~ MLA (30M) 
20x( 1.06)~ 30X(1.06)~ H4TEGRAT ION/TEST 35X~ 1.06t 20:«1.06)6 LAUNCH COST 35#1·~W ~~t- ~~w TOTAL COST (10"S) m m 101 (VB6S 
Since costs are spread over time, the above table is an approximation but 
deemed acceptable. 
LANDSAT E is estimated as a two and one-half to three year program with 
expenditures of 20 percent, 50 percent and 30 percent 1n each 01 the years (as 
per GSFC). LANDSAT F is estimated as a five year program with expendi-
tures of 15 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent and J. 5 percent in 
each of the years (as per GSFC). These values have been adjusted to re-flect 
the launch cos··~· Thus, as indicated by the "Construction In Progress," the 
cumulative expe:llditures add up to 100 percent when launch occurs. 
Without knowledge of what G and G' will comprise, annual expenditures have 
been estimated and are based upon the previous history of expenditures. 
(24) Cash RequirernJm,.t in Days - It is assumed that 15 days of cash are required 
as measured against total revenlJe (i.e., 15/365 x total revenue). 
(25) A/R ReqUirement in Days - It is assumed that accounts receivable arp. an 
average of 60 days old. Average ac:col,lnts reccivabl~ balance is equal to 
approximately 1/6 of revenue (i.e., 60/365 x revenue). 
(26) Current LiabilitY Requirement in Day~ - Current liabilities are assumed to be 
paid within 30 days. 
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(27) Contributed Capital - Contributed capital for the private sector financial 
projections are assumed to be an initial capitalization of $7' mUlion. The 
capital investment remains constilnt over the ten year period. 
(28) ~o5t of Borrowing - Long-term borrowing rates are assumed to be 11 percent 
over the ten year projectior.. ,.he 11 percent borrowing rate is predicated 
upon the 6 percent inflation rate "Jsed in thl! projection. '''!though current 
long-term borrowing rates are currently higher than J I percent, it is as:5umed 
tnat by 198', the first year of the projection, that long-term rates will be in 
the 10-12 percent range. 
(29) Federal and State Tax Rate - A '1 percent combined federal and state tax 
rate has been used to calculate prOVision for taxes on net income (46 
percent federal, , percent state). 
(30) Investment Tax Credit Sal! - Property quaJlfying for the investment tax 
credit is reflected for calculation purposes. All space segment property both 
fuJly constructed and in process during the year are included in the 
investment tax credit base. 
til) !Qvcstment rax Credit Rate -.A. 10 percent investment tax credit has been 
apptied to aU quaHfied property. For tax purposes, a five year ACRS life has 
been assumed. For depreciation purposes, a , percent reduction to the basis 
of aU depreciable property has been applied. 
(32) Equity Participation by the U.S. Government - It is assumed that for the 
legislatively-chartered, privately-owned corporation scenario, the U.S. 
government's equity participation wiU be 33 percent. The percentage 
participation used is arbitrary, and is used for iUustrative purposes. 
(33) Research .!I'd Development Tax Credit Ra~ - A l' percent R&D tax credit 
~ate has been assumed although the predse rate may vary. The exact rate 
aPl'lied will be depefldent upon the nature of the R&D, a,verage annual 
expenditures and type of R&D (in-house research expenses vs. contract 
research expenses). 
(34) Royalties-Ba~e Fee. This amount reflects the minimum guaranteed royalty 
or licensing fee paid ~ the U.S. government under the private sector 
marketing scenario. A minimum base fee of $33.' million fllr the exclusive 
marketing rights to LANDSAT data is assumed. 
(3;) Royalties as a Pe!£~n.lage of Sales· It is assumed that a minimum royalty of 
80 percent of LANDSAT sales would be paid to the U.S. government if 80 
percent of sales exceed the guaranteed minimum of $33 • .5 million. 
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(36) Government R&D Expenditures - Current government R&D expenditures re-
• lating to the current land remote sensing system are not currently ac-
cumulated in a manner conducive to used for' projection purposes. A $10 
million per year R&D expenditure by the U.S. government has been used for 
projection purposes in aU scenarios other than planned phase-out. 
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(37) Direct Costs - The equations used for the computation of processin~, ar-
chiving and sales costs are as foUows: 
Processing Cost (I) = [M1S(J) + MFS(I)] x K x PMSS(I) 
+ (11S(I) + 1FS(I)] x K x P1M(J) + IOU) 
Archival Cost (i) = [(M1S(I) + MFS(I)) x AMSS(I) 
+ (115(1) + 1FS(I» x A1M (I)) x AF x LA (J) 
Sales Cost (I) = (M1S(I) x SMSS1(I) + MFS(I) x SMSSF(I) 
+ 11S(I) x S1M1(I) + 1FS(I) x S1MF(I)] x LSm 
+ (M1S(I) + MFS(I) + 11S(I) + 1FS(I)) x clm 
K = CF x AF 
where 
MFS(I) 
= 
MTS(I) 
= 
TFS(I) 
= 
T15m 
= 
PMSS(I) = 
PTM(I) -
10m 
= 
AM5S(I) = 
ATM(I) = 
LAm .-
SMSST(I) = 
SMSSF(I) = 
STMT(I) = 
Number of MSS film scenes sold in year I 
Number of MSS tape scenes sold in year I 
Number of 1M film scenes sold in year I 
Number of 1M tape scenes sold in year I 
Per scene cost to process MSS data at Goddard 
Per scene cost to process 1M data at Goddard 
Indirect costs associated with processing MSS and TM data 
at Goddard 
Per scene cost to archive MSS data at EDC 
Per scene cost to archive TM data at EDC 
Learning rate associated wjth the archiving procedure 
Per scene cost of reproducing for sale an MSS tape scene 
Per scene cost of reproducing for sale an MSS film scene 
Per scene cost of reproducing for sale a TM tape scene 
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STMl'U> = 
LSU> = 
CI = 
AF = 
CF = 
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Per scene cost of reproducing for sale a TM fUm scene 
Learning rate associated with reproducing for sale 
Per scene cost of customer interface 
Archival factor (see Note 6) 
Cloud factor (see Note 6) 
f- ,,+ 
(38) £gr."munlcs.tons Cost· The f::t;tuatlons used tor th~ computation of T!)RSS and 
COMSA l' costs are as tollows: 
TDRSS Cost (I) = [ MFS(J) + MTS(l) j x K x T MSS(I) 
+ [TFS(I) + rTS(I)] x K x T TM (I) 
DOMSAT Cost CI) = [MFS(I) + "~TS(I)] x K x 0MSS(I) 
+ [TFS(I) + TTS(I)] x K x DTM(I) 
where 
TMSS(I) = 
'!' TM~I) = 
°MSS(I) = 
Per scene cost to transmit MSS via TORSS (satellite to 
White Sands) 
~er ~cene cost to transmit TM via TDRSS 
Per scene cost to transmit MSS via OOMSA T (trom White 
Sands to Goddard, and frt')m Goddard to eOC) 
Per scene cost to transmit TM via DOMSAT (White Sands to 
Goddard) 
and other ~erm5 are as defined in Note 37. 
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